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After decades of virtual invisibility, monopoly and oligopoly are
attracting the attention of leading political and public figures again.
Corporate control of markets is now seen as an important source of
economic and political ills in American society. These ills include not just
higher prices for consumers, but also increased economic inequality and a
compromised democracy. This corporate domination of economy and
politics was not inevitable, dictated by impersonal forces such as
“globalization” or “technology.” On the contrary, it is the result of
conscious policy choices initiated in the late 1970s and 1980s that
succeeded in focusing antitrust law on the narrow concept of economic
efficiency and establishing legal standards friendly to powerful businesses.
The weakened antitrust laws have given large corporations freedom to
dominate markets through mergers, exclusionary conduct, and restrictive
trade practices.
The Supreme Court has the power to undo these changes, but an
antitrust revival through the common law process is doubtful and, at best,
sure to be protracted. When favorable political circumstances exist,
advocates of renewed antitrust enforcement should instead look to the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The FTC has broad policymaking
authority under modern administrative law and has quasi-legislative power
delegated to it by Congress. The FTC can resurrect antitrust law under the
FTC Act’s prohibition on unfair methods of competition. In using this
power, the FTC should reject the ahistorical efficiency model for antitrust
and embrace the political economic goals articulated by Congress when it
created the Commission in 1914. In an era of high inequality, diminished
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economic opportunity, and elite capture of politics, the goals of protecting
consumers, maintaining open markets, and dispersing economic and
political power remain as important as ever. To restore competitive market
structures, the FTC should establish a series of presumptions against
competitively suspicious practices and challenge market power highly
damaging to the public.
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INTRODUCTION
After decades of general neglect,1 monopoly and oligopoly are now a
topic of wide interest in the United States. Corporate domination of wide
swaths of the economy is a focus of public debate.2 This discussion is not
confined to one part of the political spectrum. A progressive senator,3 the
2016 Democratic candidate for the presidency,4 the centrist Obama White
House,5 and a conservative business publication6 have all agreed that the
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1. See Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY
235-51 (2016) (providing statistics on declining U.S. antitrust enforcement since 1970, and
the implications of weak enforcement in several industries); Maurice E. Stucke,
Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 553-54 (2012) (observing the lack of
public interest in both antitrust specifically and economic concentration generally); see also
Harry First & Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
2543, 2544 (2013) (describing the antitrust system as one “captured by lawyers and
economists advancing their own self-referential goals, free of political control and economic
accountability”).
2. See Ryan Cooper, Even Republicans are Getting Fed Up with Monopolies. Here’s
Why., THE WEEK (Mar. 31, 2016), http://theweek.com/articles/613950/even-republicans-aregetting-fed-monopolies-heres-why [https://perma.cc/968Y-MELM] (“[T]oday, the results of
monopoly are so patently horrible that even some conservatives are beginning to come
around.”); Paul Krugman, Challenging the Oligarchy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17robert-reich-challenging-oligarchy/
[https://perma.cc/5T77-TX3X] (describing an argument attributing increased economic
inequality to monopolies); Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul,
ATLANTIC, Oct. 24, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/howdemocrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/ (“At the same time that the nation has
achieved perhaps the most tolerant culture in U.S. history, the destruction of the antimonopoly and anti-bank tradition in the Democratic Party has also cleared the way for the
greatest concentration of economic power in a century.”).
3. See Elizabeth Warren, Senator, Keynote Address at New America’s Open Markets
Program Event: Reigniting Competition in the American Economy, (June 29, 2016)
(arguing that the lack of competition in the markets “threatens our economy, and threatens
our democracy”).
4. See Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton: Being Pro-Business Doesn’t Mean Hanging
Consumers Out to Dry, QUARTZ (Oct. 20, 2015), http://qz.com/529303/hillary-clintonbeing-pro-business-doesnt-mean-hanging-consumers-out-to-dry/
[https://perma.cc/5EZLJB2E] (describing the negative impacts of monopolies on American consumers).
5. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS OF
MARKET POWER 4-6 (2016), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/
20160414_cea_competition_issue_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3CX-KQ3G] (detailing the
proof of decline in competition).
6. See Too Much of a Good Thing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needsgiant-dose-competition-too-much-good-thing [https://perma.cc/759G-FD59] (arguing that
high profits indicate a need for competition).
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non-competitive structure of many markets hurts the public. The harms
from concentrated markets appear to range from higher prices for consumer
products7 and lower incomes for producers8 to the multi-decade growth in
inequality9 to the decline in business formation10 to the subversion of
democratic politics by powerful private entities.11
Importantly, commentators have recognized that the current industrial
structure in the United States was not inevitable. Present economic
arrangements are the product of a deliberate policy choice—starting in the
late 1970s and accelerating in the 1980s under the Reagan administration—
to neuter the enforcement of the antitrust laws outside of price fixing, bid
rigging and market allocation between competitors.12
Subsequent
administrations, including Democratic ones, have followed this antitrust
philosophy.13 Antitrust officials in the executive branch and federal judges
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7. See, e.g., id. (“Last year America’s airlines made $24 billion—more than Alphabet,
the parent company of Google. Even as the price of fuel, one of airlines’ main expenses,
collapsed alongside the oil price, little of that benefit was passed on to consumers through
lower prices, with revenues remaining fairly flat. After a bout of consolidation in the past
decade the industry is dominated by four firms with tight financial discipline and many
shareholders in common. And the return on capital is similar to that seen in Silicon
Valley.”)
8. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice Stucke, The E-Scraper and E-Monopsony, AUTHORS
GUILD (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/law-profs-antitrustenforcers-rein-super-platforms-look-upstream/ [https://perma.cc/SV8H-Q34R] (associating
the decline in average income for authors to the growing monopsony power of Amazon over
book publishers).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 2 (2015) (offering statistics on the growth of
inequality); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 265 (2017) (stating
that firms in concentrated markets, as opposed to competitive markets, can obtain political
influence to support favorable policy).
10. See, e.g., Stacy Mitchell, The View from the Shop—Antitrust and the Decline of
America’s Independent Businesses, 61 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 498, 502 (2016) (noting the
decrease in small businesses, and the corresponding increase in large corporations in
government policy, from 1997-2012).
11. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 3, at 3 (“The larger and more economically powerful
these companies get, the more resources they can bring to bear on lobbying government to
change the rules to benefit exactly the companies that are doing the lobbying. Over time,
this means a closed, self-perpetuating, rigged system – a playing field that lavishes favors on
the big guys, hammers the small guys, and fuels even more concentration.”)
12. Warren, supra note 3, at 5-6; David Dayen, Bring Back Antitrust, THE AM.
(Nov.
9,
2015),
http://prospect.org/article/bring-back-antitrust-0
PROSPECT
[https://perma.cc/356M-SMAZ]; Kevin Drum, Our Four-Decade Antitrust Experiment Has
Failed, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 15, 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2016/03/
our-four-decade-antitrust-experiment-has-failed [https://perma.cc/2BQ7-VJV4].
13. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION: WORKLOAD STATISTICS: FY
2006-2015
5-6
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download
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have applied these laws to focus narrowly on the neoclassical concept of
allocative efficiency and adopted defendant-friendly legal standards.14 This
constricted focus contradicts the broad economic, political, and social
purposes of antitrust laws. A body of law that could historically be
characterized as “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty”15 and “the
Magna Carta of free enterprise”16 has been reduced to a technocratic field
with limited reach.
While the courts could and should reinterpret the antitrust laws to
accord with Congress’s vision in 1890 and 1914 through the common law
process, this judicial restoration, even under the best of circumstances, is
sure to be a slow process. Given the conservative composition of the
courts, in particular the Supreme Court, reinterpretation of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts does not seem imminent. Many liberal judges have accepted,
in large measure, the efficiency-oriented antitrust that has been dominant
for nearly forty years. For example, Justice Breyer17 and even liberal icon
Justice Brennan18 authored or joined notable opinions that advanced the
project to curtail antitrust law. Even if President Obama had appointed
Merrick Garland and established a liberal majority on the Supreme Court,
the Court would likely not have ushered in an antitrust revival.19 And now
with Justice Gorsuch succeeding Justice Scalia,20 the Supreme Court is
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[https://perma.cc/EYB6-DLAL] (noting that from 2006 to 2015, the Bush and Obama
administrations together filed just one monopolization suit, and the number of merger cases
filed annually remained about the same).
14. See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust—Retrospective and
Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936
(1987) (detailing the development of the pro-defendant approaches of federal judges and
executive branch officials).
15. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
16. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
17. E.g., Credit Suisse Secs. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 264 (2007) (holding
that “securities law implicitly precludes the application of the antitrust laws to the conduct
alleged in this case”); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549
U.S. 312, 318, 326 (2007) (applying a heightened standard to a predatory-bidding claim and
holding that the standard was not met).
18. E.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340, 346 (1990)
(citation omitted) (finding that the plaintiff had suffered “no ‘antitrust injury’”)); Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986) (finding that the plaintiff did not
sufficiently allege “a threat of antitrust injury” caused by predatory pricing).
19. See Michael D. Shear et al., Obama Chooses Merrick Garland for Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/us/politics/obamasupreme-court-nominee.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/5BCU-587Y]
(citing
Charles
Chamberlain as stating that Garland was a nominee “seemingly designed to appease
intransigent Republicans”).
20. Roert Barnes & Ashley Parker, Neil M. Gorsuch Sworn in as 113th Supreme Court
Justice, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
courts_law/gorsuch-to-be-sworn-in-to-supreme-court-today-in-two-
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likely to cabin antitrust law even further.21
Under progressive leadership, one federal agency, the FTC, could
resurrect antitrust law as “a comprehensive charter of economic liberty.”22
Modern administrative law and Congressional delegation of policymaking
authority grant the FTC expansive power to interpret the antitrust provision
of Section 5 of the FTC Act.23 In enacting this statute, Congress articulated
a grand progressive-populist vision of antitrust. It wanted the FTC to
police “unfair methods of competition” that injure consumers, prevent
rivals from competing on the merits, and allow large corporations to
dominate our political system.24 Congress intended the FTC’s antitrust
authority to encompass more than the prohibitions in the Sherman and
Clayton Acts and to nip anticompetitive problems in the embryonic stage
before corporations gained undue power over consumers, small suppliers,
competitors, and the American political system.25
Since the early 1980s, the FTC has championed antitrust law centered
on economic efficiency. In 2015, the FTC codified this approach in a
Statement of Enforcement Principles laying out its interpretation of Section
5’s prohibition on unfair methods of competition.26 The FTC stated that it
would use its Section 5 authority to advance “consumer welfare,” which is
functionally similar to the allocative efficiency goal, and apply the rule of
reason framework.27 In articulating this narrow interpretation of Section 5,
the FTC contradicted Congress’s political economic vision in 1914, which
sought to prevent not only short-term injuries to consumers, but also
exclusionary practices by large businesses and the accumulation of private
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ceremonies/2017/04/10/9ac361fe-1ddb-11e7-ad74-3a742a6e93a7_story.html?utm_
term=.719f53c85f19 [https://perma.cc/5UGA-EQRS].
21. Zephyr Teachout, Neil Gorsuch Sides with Big Business, Big Donors and Big
Bosses, WASH. POST (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/
2017/02/21/neil-gorsuch-always-sides-with-big-business-big-donors-and-bigbosses/?utm_term=.959433de0043 [https://perma.cc/B5VV-4GDT]; see, e.g., Novell, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1075 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that a monopolist’s refusal
to deal is actionable under the antitrust laws only if the monopolist sacrificed profits in the
process).
22. N. Pac. Ry Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
23. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair
Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 80 Fed.
Reg. 57,056, 57,056 (Sep. 21, 2015) [hereinafter “Section 5 Statement”] (stating that
Congress “left the development of Section 5 to the Federal Trade Commission as an expert
administrative body”).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Section 5 also prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” 15 U.S.C. §
45(a) (2006). This Article will focus exclusively on the FTC’s “unfair methods of
competition” authority.
27. Section 5 Statement, supra note 23.
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I.

THE FTC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO DEFINE THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5

C M
Y K
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The FTC has broad power to define the meaning of Section 5.
Modern administrative law gives executive and independent agencies
considerable freedom to define the meaning of statutes phrased in general
terms. A body of law, originating with the Supreme Court’s landmark

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 71 Side A

political power. And in making the rule of reason the centerpiece of its
analytical framework, the FTC adopted a convoluted test that cannot
advance the Congressional vision underlying Section 5.
Despite being a champion of the efficiency paradigm since 1981, the
FTC under progressive leadership in the future could still change course
and be true to the Congressional intent from when the agency was created
more than a century ago. In setting out an interpretation of Section 5,
whether through enforcement actions or rulemakings, the FTC should
anchor Section 5 in the expansive political economic vision of Congress.
By enacting the FTC Act, Congress sought to prevent—rather than remedy
after the fact—three principal harms from concentrated economic power:
wealth transfers from consumers and producers to monopolies, oligopolies,
and cartels; private blockades against entry and competition in markets;
and the accumulation of economic and political power in corporate hands.
To advance Congress’s antitrust vision, the FTC should adopt
presumptions of illegality for a variety of competitively suspicious conduct,
such as mergers in concentrated industries, exclusionary practices by firms
with market dominance or near-dominance, and restraints on retail
competition; and challenge monopolies and oligopolies that inflict
significant harm on the public. When seeking to preserve or restore
competitive market structures, the FTC should pursue simple structural
remedies over complicated behavioral fixes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines modern
administrative law and Congressional intent to show that the FTC has
broad power to interpret Section 5. Part II describes the expansive political
economic vision—one focused on preventing the rise of concentrated
private power—that Congress had when it enacted the FTC Act in 1914.
Part III turns to recent FTC policymaking on Section 5. It explains how the
Commission, by endorsing the consumer welfare goal and rule of reason
framework in its 2015 Statement of Enforcement Principles, failed to honor
Congressional intent. Part IV lays out an interpretation of Section 5 that is
rooted in Congressional intent and that would advance the three primary
goals expressed in the legislative history of the FTC Act. Part V responds
to likely objections to the proposed interpretation of Section 5.
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1984 decision Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,28 has granted elastic quasi-legislative power to the administrative state.
The Court held in Chevron that agencies have power to interpret
ambiguously worded statutes so long as the interpretation is reasonable.29
Section 5 of the FTC Act, with its language on “unfair methods of
competition,” is the type of generally worded statute that an agency is
empowered to interpret.30
In addition to interpretive authority under Chevron, when Congress
enacted the FTC Act in 1914, it expressly granted the Commission the
power to define the meaning of “unfair methods of competition.” Congress
was reacting to the Supreme Court decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States in which the Court held that it had the ultimate power to interpret the
Sherman Act.31 In delegating the power to define “unfair methods of
competition” to the FTC, Congress sought to reassert control over the
development of antitrust policy and prevent the courts from subverting
legislative desires.
A. Modern Administrative Law Gives the FTC Broad Discretion to
Interpret Section 5

C M
Y K

05/11/2017 10:58:06

28. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
29. Id. at 842-45.
30. Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of Administrative Antitrust, 76 U.
PITT. L. REV. 209, 248 (2014); Royce Zeisler, Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and
Why the FTC Should Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 266, 291-92 (2014).
31. 221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911).
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Modern administrative law has transferred significant lawmaking
power from the courts to the numerous executive and independent agencies
in the federal government. Questions of statutory interpretation that were
once the jealous prerogative of the courts are now often resolved by, for
example, the Department of Labor, the Environmental Protection Agency,
or the Federal Communications Commission. While agency statutory
interpretations are still subject to judicial review, interpretations of statutes
phrased in general terms are examined under a deferential legal standard.
The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision revolutionized administrative
law and policymaking in the United States. In reviewing a challenge to an
interpretation of the Clean Air Act by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Court established a deferential standard of review for agency
interpretations of statutes. The Court held that an agency’s interpretation
of a statute would be accorded deference if the statute is ambiguously
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worded and the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.32 In practice,
Chevron deference has meant that an agency’s interpretation is permissible
unless the statute’s language expressly forecloses this particular
interpretation.33 Chevron deference represents a transfer of power from the
courts to the executive branch. Statutes that were traditionally interpreted
by the federal courts are now often given meaning by federal agencies.34
The Court in Chevron justified this transfer of lawmaking and
policymaking functions to agencies on multiple grounds. First, open-ended
statutory language presumably reflects a desire on the part of Congress for
agencies to interpret the statute.35 Second, the Court stated that agencies
are better equipped than the courts, both in terms of expertise and
resources, to decide the technical questions often implicated in statutory
interpretation.36 Third, the Court stated that agency heads, while they are
not selected by popular vote, do answer to the democratically elected
president.37 As such, agencies face more public accountability than federal
judges with life tenure.
An agency’s interpretation of a statute does not have to be articulated
through notice-and-comment rulemaking to receive Chevron deference.
Agencies have broad discretion over the policy instrument that they use to
articulate interpretations of a statute.38
While notice-and-comment
rulemakings are one of the most common means of propounding an
interpretation of a statute, interpretations made through formal
adjudications are also typically entitled to Chevron deference.39 Whether
Chevron deference applies to interpretations made through other means,
such as policy statements, is decided on a case-by-case basis.40
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32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
33. Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA.
L. REV. 597, 601 (2009).
34. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 833 (2006) (exploring the
connection between the rate at which judges validate agency interpretations and their
political ideologies).
35. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
36. Id. at 865.
37. Id.
38. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he Board is not
precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding and . . . the choice
between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s
discretion.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (“[T]he choice made
between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies
primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency.”).
39. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-31 (2001).
40. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 218 (2006).
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Agencies also have the power to revise and reverse earlier statutory
interpretations. The Supreme Court decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services41 upheld a
significant change in the Federal Communications Commission’s
interpretation of a statutory provision. Provided they offer a reasoned
explanation for the changed interpretation, agencies’ revised interpretations
of a statute are entitled to Chevron deference.42 Agencies are thereby not
bound by prior interpretations. They have the power to interpret and
reinterpret ambiguously phrased statutes over time. Recently, the Supreme
Court granted agencies procedural flexibility on revisiting interpretive
rules, policy statements, and other regulatory interpretations that were not
made through notice-and-comment rulemaking. In Perez v. Mortgage
Bankers Ass’n, the Court held that agencies can subsequently revise these
less formal interpretations without going through the notice-and-comment
process.43
The FTC’s interpretation of Section 5’s prohibition on unfair methods
of competition is almost certain to receive Chevron deference. The words
“unfair methods of competition” are not self-defining and susceptible to
multiple interpretations. These words are open-ended in content and, on
their face, allow for a broad range of permissible interpretations. One
scholar has succinctly captured how nebulous Section 5 is: “Nearly every
word of the statute is rife with ambiguity: What is unfair? Unfair to
whom? . . . What is a method? . . . What is competition?”44 In light of its
wording, Section 5 appears to be the paradigmatic example of a statute
whose interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.

Congress, in creating the FTC, expressly sought to empower the
agency to define the meaning of “unfair methods of competition.” The
Congress that enacted the FTC Act was reacting to the Supreme Court’s
landmark ruling in Standard Oil Co. v. United States.45 In this decision, the
Court had established the rule of reason as the framework for analyzing
most trade restraints and held that it had the power to articulate the
meaning of the Sherman Act.46 Congress passed the FTC Act to reestablish

545 U.S. 967, 1000-01 (2005).
Id. at 981-82; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16 (2009).
135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2015).
Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 248-49.
221 U.S. 1, 69-70 (1911).
Id.
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control over the development of competition policy and accordingly
delegated the authority to define unfair methods of competition to the FTC.
In light of this history, the FTC could arguably claim that its interpretation
of Section 5 is entitled to deference, even in the absence of Chevron.47
The Supreme Court’s decision in Standard Oil generated much public
and congressional outrage. Although the Court had found the oil refining
giant liable for monopolization and ordered the dissolution of the company,
the Court also implicitly claimed the prerogative of interpreting the
Sherman Act under the rule of reason framework.48 The decision was seen
as a power grab by the Court.49 The courts were anti-populist and pro-big
business and routinely struck down federal and state public interest
regulation that protected ordinary Americans.50
Given this elitist
orientation of the federal courts, many feared that the rule of reason meant
the evisceration of the Sherman Act.51 The holding in Standard Oil was a
major step in this direction as it established, in the common law of the
Sherman Act, two classes of monopolies: bad monopolies and good
monopolies.52
In the wake of the 1912 election that involved passionate debates and

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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47. For an example of the Court granting deference to an agency interpretation of a
statute on account of express Congressional delegation of authority, see Schweiker v. Gray
Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981) (citation omitted) (“In view of this explicit delegation of
substantive authority, the Secretary’s definition [of the contested term] . . . is entitled to
‘legislative effect’ because, ‘in a situation of this kind, Congress entrusts to the Secretary,
rather than to the courts, the primary responsibility for interpreting the statutory term.’”).
But see, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 137 (2d. Cir 1984) (“As
the Commission moves away from attacking conduct that is either a violation of the antitrust
laws of collusive, coercive, predatory, restrictive or deceitful, and seeks to break new
ground by enjoining otherwise legitimate practices, the closer must be our scrutiny upon
judicial review.”).
48. Dow Votaw, Antitrust in 1914: The Climate of Opinion, 24 ABA SEC. OF
ANTITRUST L. 14, 20-21 (1964).
49. Id. at 21; Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 231 (1980). Justice
Harlan in his dissent accused his colleagues in the majority of seizing legislative powers for
the Supreme Court. Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
50. E.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a ban on yellowdog contracts), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941);
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a law that limited the number of
hours that bakery employees could work), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); K. Sabeel Rahman, Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political
Economy in the New Gilded Age: Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1329, 1329-30 (2016).
51. Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control,
and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 13-14 (2003).
52. Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, The Good and Bad Trust Dichotomy: A
Short History of a Legal Idea, 35 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 57, 80 (1990).
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53. See generally Daniel A. Crane, All I Really Need to Know About Antitrust I
Learned in 1912, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2025 (2015) (noting that debates about the benefits of a
competitive economy were pervasive in the rhetoric of the 1912 presidential candidates).
54. Winerman, supra note 51, at 3-5.
55. See, e.g., Winerman, supra note 51, at 52, 74 (noting that President Wilson in his
1912 campaign had promoted a statute with specific prohibitions and that proponents of the
FTC Act believed in the value of a generally-worded prohibition).
56. Winerman, supra note 51, at 67.
57. Averitt, supra note 49, at 234.
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2, 3, 7 (2015); 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2015).
59. Averitt, supra note 49, at 230, 236; Winerman, supra note 51, at 76.
60. A. Everette MacIntyre & Joachim J. Volhard, The Federal Trade Commission and
Incipient Unfairness, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 407, 416 (1973).
61. 47 CONG. REC. 1225 (1911).
62. 51 CONG. REC. 13047 (1914).
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competing visions of antitrust,53 Congress sought to reclaim authority over
competition policy. Among those who favored additional antitrust
legislation, a significant policy disagreement existed. Some supported a
law that would prohibit a list of problematic practices, while others
endorsed a general prohibition on anticompetitive behavior, akin to what
Congress had done earlier with the Sherman Act.54 A statute that
prohibited enumerated practices would provide greater legal guidance and
certainty for businesses.55 It, however, would almost certainly be underinclusive56 and susceptible to evasion over time, as profit-oriented
businesses found new ways to engage in anticompetitive behavior.57
Congress ultimately pursued both options: it passed the Clayton Act that
prohibited particular practices and the FTC Act that outlawed unfair
methods of competition in general.58
Congress created the FTC to maintain control over the meaning of
unfair methods of competition and granted the Commission interpretive
authority. Without the Commission, the members of Congress and
Senators involved in drafting the FTC Act feared that the courts would
apply a restrictive “judicial gloss” on unfair methods of competition.59
Congress created the Commission “to exercise a legislative function to the
extent of determining what constitutes an unfair method of competition.”60
The FTC was created to act, in effect, as an arm of Congress that would use
its expertise and investigatory powers to advance the legislative will.
Laying out a vision of political accountability, Senator Newlands wanted a
new commission to be “the servant of Congress.”61 Senator Cummins
stressed the political accountability of a commission and touted the
superiority of “a commission at all times under the power of Congress, at
all times under the eye of the people” over “the comparative seclusion of
the courts.”62
To guard further against judicial encroachment in the interpretation of
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Section 5, Congress took another important step. The drafters of the FTC
Act adopted the term of art “unfair methods of competition.”63 Initial drafts
used the established term “unfair competition.”64 This term was (and still
is) associated with a large body of common law concerning businesses
passing off their goods as those of a rival,65 rather than anticompetitive
practices. Using the term “unfair competition” and indirectly invoking the
related precedent in the statute raised the specter of the courts once again
thwarting congressional will. Members of Congress feared that courts
would use this language to assert authority to interpret Section 5 and, in
particular, apply the precedent on “unfair competition” to narrow what
Congress intended to be an expansive statute.66
The Supreme Court has recognized the policymaking power that
Congress granted to the FTC. In FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., the
Court observed that Congress wanted to preserve interpretive flexibility
when it prohibited unfair methods of competition.67 The Court stated that
Congress, by design, declined to anchor “the concept of unfairness to a
common-law or statutory standard or by enumerating the particular
practices to which it was intended to apply.”68 As such, unfair methods of
competition are not limited to acts that may violate the other antitrust
statutes.69 In affirming the Commission’s broad policymaking power, the
Court held that the FTC “does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated
standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values
beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of
the antitrust laws.”70 A subsequent Supreme Court decision affirmed the
Commission’s power to define unfair methods of competition.71
IN ENACTING THE FTC ACT, CONGRESS HAD AN EXPANSIVE
VISION FOR SECTION 5

The Congress that enacted the FTC Act and created the Commission
had an ambitious progressive-populist vision for the new agency. It
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63. Averitt, supra note 49, at 235.
64. Averitt, supra note 49, at 235.
65. Averitt, supra note 49, at 235.
66. Averitt, supra note 49, at 235. Supporters of the FTC Act had much less faith in
the courts than those who believed the Sherman Act’s rule of reason was sufficient to
control monopoly power. Winerman, supra note 51, at 76.
67. 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 244.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1986).
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established an agency with enforcement, research, and policymaking
powers. In granting the agency the power to prohibit the open-ended
“unfair methods of competition,” Congress expressed expansive political
economic aims that should guide the Commission’s exercise of its powers.
Congress aimed to protect consumers and producers from wealth-extracting
firms with market power, preserve open markets for all comers, and
prevent the concentration of private power. Congress had expressed similar
objectives in enacting the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
Section 5 was meant to be narrower in some respects than the other
two principal antitrust statutes—and broader in others. Unlike the
substantive provisions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Section 5 lacks a
private right of action or a treble damages remedy.72 Congress, however,
intended it to reach a wider array of conduct than the other two antitrust
statutes. Importantly, Congress wanted Section 5 to be an incipiency
statute, which nips anticompetitive practices in the bud and prevents
monopolies and oligopolies from developing in the first place.
A. Section 5 of the FTC Act Has a Multifaceted Political Economic
Purpose
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72. Amy Marshak, The Federal Trade Commission on the Frontier: Suggestions for
the Use of Section 5, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1128 (2011).
73. See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary
Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982)
(noting that the floor debates over federal antitrust legislation suggest that Congress
“condemned monopolies”); James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and
Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 1880-1918, 50 OH. ST. L.J. 257
(1989) (discussing legislators’ conflicting views on concentrated capitalism in the early
twentieth century). Congress reaffirmed this broad vision in subsequent antitrust statutes.
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., The Future of Antitrust: Ideology Vs. Legislative Intent, 35 ANTITRUST
BULL. 575, 583-88 (1990).

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 74 Side B

Congress, in creating the FTC, had an ambitious vision for its Section
5 powers. While the term “unfair methods of competition” is vague and
susceptible to multiple interpretations, the legislative debates culminating
in the passage of the FTC Act reveal three central purposes. The members
of Congress involved in drafting and passing the FTC Act wanted to
protect consumers from wealth transfers, maintain markets open to all
comers, and prevent the concentration of private economic and political
power. These goals are remarkably similar to those expressed in the
debates leading up to the enactment of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.73
Congress enacted the antitrust laws in response to growing public fears
about and hostility toward the large-scale corporate entities that emerged in
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the decades following the Civil War.74 Contrary to Robert Bork and other
conservative thinkers, the legislative histories of the FTC Act do not show
a concern with promoting economic efficiency as defined by neoclassical
economics, or even an awareness of the concept.75
The legislative debates reveal a widely shared anger toward large
businesses that used their power to extract wealth from consumers and
producers and a desire for the FTC to prevent this type of redistribution.
Several members of Congress and Senators expressed outrage at how
corporations could use their power in the market to raise prices and capture
the wealth of the consuming public. As Robert Lande has shown, the
prevention of redistribution through the exercise of market power was an
important objective.76 Congress sought to prevent large corporations from
using their power to deprive consumers of the benefits of technical progress
and producers of the fruits of their labor. A sample of quotes from the
legislative debate underscores the importance of this goal. The principal
sponsor of the FTC Act in the Senate condemned “unreasonable and
extortionate prices.”77 A colleague, Senator Lane, stated that Americans
are “being compelled to pay arbitrarily fixed and unjustly high prices for
what they consume [and that] they are being robbed.”78 Representative
Morgan expressed hope that the FTC would “minimize the power of the
large industrial corporation to concentrate wealth . . . and secure the people
from unjust tribute levied by monopolistic corporations.”79 A House report
noted that powerful purchasers (monopsonies and oligopsonies in modern
economic terms) could similarly use their power to depress prices paid to
employees and other small producers.80
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74. See David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1219, 1226 (1988) (“The advent of big business on this massive scale was a traumatic event.
‘[T]he old gentry, the merchants of long standing, the small manufacturers, the established
professional men, the civic leaders of an earlier era’ saw themselves deprived of economic
power, opportunity, personal independence, and social status. This urban middle class, the
backbone of the progressive reform movement, was profoundly antagonistic to big business,
and no one complained more bitterly than the owners of small businesses. Agrarian
populism also identified big business, particularly the great railroad combinations, with the
farmer’s increasingly tenuous control over his livelihood. Labor sought strength in
collective organization to protect itself from the power of massed capit Thus, a broad
spectrum of American society complained bitterly about the evil powers of the trusts.”).
75. Barak Orbach, How Antitrust Lost Its Goal, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2253, 2275
(2013) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
427 (rev. ed. 1993).
76. Lande, supra note 73, at 112-14.
77. S. REP. NO. 63-597, at § 7 (1914).
78. 51 CONG. REC. 13223 (1914).
79. Id. at 8854.
80. H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, pt. 1, at 14 (1914).
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51 CONG. REC. 13231 (1914).
Id. at 14792.
Id. at 13223.
May, supra note 73, at 296-97.
51 CONG. REC. 13158 (1914).
H.R. REP. NO. 63-533, pt. 3, at 5 (1914).
51 CONG. REC. 8850 (1914).
Id. at 14938.
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The Congressional debates also indicate a commitment to preserving
the openness of markets to all parties. Several members of Congress and
Senators expressed fear that large corporations would use their power to
exclude smaller rivals from the market. Senator Reed stated this
commitment to open markets eloquently: “We are trying to keep the
highways of opportunity unobstructed. We are trying to keep it so that the
feet of the men of today may travel along an open path, so that all may
have a fair chance to gain a livelihood and to embark in business.”81
In expressing this desire to maintain open markets, Senator Reed was
far from alone among his peers. Senator Burton sought to ensure “a free
field for all” in business and warned against irresistible corporate power
under which “equality of opportunity shall be destroyed or the deserving
competitor driven out of business.”82 Senator Lane worried that, without
the FTC, the typical small enterprise would be “driven out of business by
his larger or more crafty rival.”83
The fears about concentrated economic and political power and indeed
private autocracy were another important theme in the legislative debates.
The threat to democratic institutions from concentrated private power had
been a recurring motivation in enacting the other antitrust statutes.84
Senator Kenyon stated: “[I]f this Government is powerless to destroy
monopoly, then we have got to concede that monopoly is powerful enough
to destroy this Government.”85 A House Minority Report lamented how
“[f]ifty men in the United States control, through interlocking directorates,
forty percent of the wealth of the country.”86 Congressman Stevens
observed that: “vast wealth has been accumulated, especially in the hands
of a few, irresponsible except to their own consciences and sense of justice
and patriotism” and noted that “the great mass of our people have a very
just apprehension that this wealth, and [the] power growing out of it . . .
may be a potential source of injury and oppression.”87 He endorsed the
creation of an FTC because it would guard the public against this
concentration of private power.88 Senator Cummins even raised the
possibility of corporate dictatorship. He warned his colleagues against
valuing cheap goods and services too highly “if it involves the surrender of
the individual, the subjugation of a great mass of people to a single master
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mind.”89
B. Section 5 Is Intended to Be Broader than the Other Antitrust Laws
While the legislative themes underlying the FTC Act bear a close
resemblance to those underlying its sister antitrust laws, the Sherman and
Clayton Acts,90 Congress aimed to go further in some important ways when
it established the FTC. Neil Averitt’s landmark article on Section 5 laid
out several possible interpretations, which ranged from a statute that is
coterminous with the other antitrust laws to one that allows the FTC to
Among these
police virtually all types of business conduct.91
interpretations, an uncontroversial one is that Section 5 is intended, like the
Clayton Act, to be an incipient measure that prevents competitive problems
before they have come to fruition.92 In other words, Section 5 has a strong
prophylactic orientation.
This incipiency theme is evident in the legislative debates. Indeed,
Congress and many members of the public were frustrated with the
Sherman Act’s inability to tackle nascent threats to competition.93 Afterthe-fact legal action was seen as unable to address monopolies.94 Once a
corporation became a monopoly, it became difficult to restructure the
market and restore competition. To maintain competitive markets, early
and decisive legal action against anticompetitive conduct was considered
essential. President Wilson also championed a preventative approach to
antitrust policy.95
Averitt has noted that “[t]he legislative history of the Federal Trade
Commission Act is replete with references which reiterate that the function
of the Commission would be to arrest trade restraints in their incipiency.”96
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89. Id. at 12742.
90. See generally Lande, supra note 73, at 82-142 (discussing the similar congressional
goals of economic efficiency and protecting consumers from unfair wealth transfers behind
the various antitrust laws); May, supra note 73, at 288-300 (noting the “widespread
congressional commitment to the long-established ideals of economic opportunity, security
of property, freedom of exchange, and political liberty”).
91. See Averitt, supra note 49, at 238-96.
92. Id. at 242-51.
93. See Averitt, supra note 49, at 243 (noting the importance of stopping antitrust
violations in their incipiency); see also Winerman, supra note 51, at 74 (discussing the
congressional support for stopping anticompetitive acts at the start).
94. See MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 60, at 414 (emphasizing the difficulties in
addressing antitrust issues once a trend of concentration had already become evident).
95. Id. at 414 n.39 (noting President Wilson’s belief that stopping anticompetitive acts
in their incipiency would help small businessmen have a place in the market).
96. Averitt, supra note 49, at 243 (citing MacIntyre & Volhard, supra note 60, at 41415).
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97. See H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (stressing the importance of stopping
monopolies at the outset).
98. 51 CONG. REC. 13118 (1914).
99. Id. at 12030.
100. Id. at 11455.
101. Id. at 14941.
102. FTC v. Motion Picture Advert. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953).
103. FTC v. Texaco Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 225 (1968).
104. 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941).
105. Averitt, supra note 49, at 246-47.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (2015).
107. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) (rejecting the argument that
outright proof of a Section 3 Clayton violation is necessary for a Section 5 FTC Act
violation).
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The Conference Committee report stressed this theme of prevention.97
Senator Reed stated that the goal was “to strike those [anticompetitive] acts
in their incipiency instead of after they have been actually worked out into
a complete system of monopoly or restraint of trade.”98 Similarly, Senator
Newlands sought to check monopoly “in the embryo.”99 Senator Cummins
aspired “to seize the offender before his ravages”100 had violated existing
antitrust rules, and Representative Covington sounded a similar theme and
stated that “[w]hat we wish to do and ought to do above everything else is
to prevent the growth of monopoly at the beginning.”101
The courts have affirmed the incipiency standard in Section 5. While
the judiciary has not addressed incipiency—or even Section 5 more
generally—in decades, the most recent decisions are unequivocal that
Section 5 is intended to prevent anticompetitive behavior in its infancy.
The Supreme Court has stated that Section 5 is intended “to stop in their
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate [the
antitrust] Acts”102 and that “Congress enacted § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to combat in their incipiency trade practices that exhibit a
strong potential for stifling competition.”103 In Fashion Originators Guild
v. FTC, the Supreme Court similarly acknowledged this legislative purpose
behind the FTC Act, stating that the sponsors hoped “that its effect might
be prophylactic and that through it attempts to bring about complete
monopolization of an industry might be stopped in their incipiency.”104
The courts have held that the Section 5 incipiency standard applies in
cases that implicate the Clayton Act, which has its own incipiency
standard.105 Among other things, the Clayton Act covers mergers and
exclusive dealing in the sale of goods.106 In FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that the Commission
must show a substantial likelihood of harm to competition.107 Instead, the
Court held that the FTC “has power under § 5 to arrest trade restraints in
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their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of §
3 of the Clayton Act or other provisions of the antitrust laws.”108
III.

THE FTC’S 2015 AFFIRMATION OF A LIMITED ANTITRUST
THAT CONTRAVENES CONGRESS’ GOALS
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108. Id.
109. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 142 (2d Cir. 1984)
(vacating the FTC’s order finding manufacturers of gasoline additives had conducted unfair
competition methods); Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920, 928 (2d Cir.
1980) (reversing an order from the FTC forcing publisher of airline schedules to publish
certain connecting flights); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 1980)
(denying enforcement of an FTC order holding that manufacturers of plywood violated the
FTC Act by using a delivered pricing system).
110. See, e.g., Complaint at *9-12, In re Negotiated Data Sols. LLC, F.T.C. No. 510094, 2008 F.T.C. LEXIS 119 (Sept. 22, 2008) (alleging patent holder reneged on licensing
commitment following commercialization of technical standard that included patent); In re
Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 247, 249-52 (2006) (alleging invitation to collude).
111. Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 254.
112. See Section 5 Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. at 57,056 (stating that Section 5 would track
judicial interpretations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts where applicable).
113. Id.
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The FTC has interpreted Section 5 narrowly in recent decades. The
Commission’s expansive interpretation of Section 5 in the mid-twentieth
century is a distant memory in 2017. The FTC suffered three appellate
defeats in Section 5 matters in the early 1980s,109 which appear to have
instilled a multi-decade timidity. For the past thirty years, the Commission
has invoked Section 5 infrequently in litigation and settlements and has
been rather modest when it has. When the Commission has brought standalone Section 5 actions in the intervening years, these cases have
represented only marginal extensions of existing Sherman Act precedent.110
None of these actions have questioned the framework of contemporary
antitrust or sought to broaden its normative lens. While the FTC’s Section
5 antitrust authority has not been strengthened since the three appellate
losses in the 1980s, these cases preceded the Chevron revolution in
administrative law.111
Just as monopoly, economic power, and antitrust reemerged as a topic
of public debate, the FTC, in its 2015 Statement of Enforcement Principles,
voluntarily limited the scope of its power and affirmed its commitment to
the antitrust status quo.112 The Section 5 Statement endorses a limited
policy program that fails to reflect Congress’ vision in establishing the
Commission. The FTC stated that consumer welfare would be the guiding
principle in its Section 5 actions and that the rule of reason would be the
default analytical framework in such cases.113 In establishing consumer
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welfare as the sole objective of Section 5 enforcement, the FTC elevated
the conservative ideology and false historical analysis of Robert Bork and
other Chicago School academics over Congress’s intent in creating the
Commission. Congress wanted to advance a broad political economic
vision and prevent monopolies and oligopolies from emerging, rather than
wait to attack them after they had become entrenched. In addition to
defining the goal of Section 5 too narrowly, the FTC endorsed the rule of
reason, a deficient analytical framework. In practice, the rule of reason
confers de facto legality on a range of problematic business conduct.
A. The FTC Doubled Down on the Ahistorical Efficiency Paradigm
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114. Id.
115. See supra part II.A.
116. Allocative efficiency exists when goods and services are produced up to a point at
which the marginal benefit to the purchaser equals the marginal cost of production. If
antitrust law promotes allocative efficiency, it seeks to police conduct that prevents the
production of goods and services from reaching the socially optimal level. This so-called
deadweight loss means that the marginal benefit from additional output exceeds the
marginal cost. Critically, this marginal benefit is tied to a consumer’s willingness and
ability to pay. Under the allocative efficiency framework, a wealthy person’s desire for a
luxury vacation home is accorded more significance than a poor person’s need for lifesaving
healthcare. See Barak Orbach, Was the Crisis in Antitrust a Trojan Horse?, 79 ANTITRUST
L.J. 881, 893-94 (2013).
117. See, e.g., Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need To Be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON.
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In its Section 5 Statement, the FTC affirmed its commitment to the
neoclassical interpretation of antitrust law. The Commission stated that its
Section 5 actions would be “guided by the goal of promoting consumer
welfare.”114 By using this language, the FTC did not present as much
clarity as it might have thought it did. In the antitrust world, “consumer
welfare” is not a settled term and has been the source of a running debate
between those who believe consumer welfare should cover flesh-and-blood
consumers and those who believe it should account for the welfare of
consumers and producers. Regardless of the interpretation the FTC
intended to adopt, it failed to honor Congress’s intentions in enacting
Section 5. When it passed the FTC Act, Congress viewed the protection of
consumers as only one of several antitrust goals that the new Commission
should advance.115
The definition of consumer welfare has been a contentious topic in
modern antitrust. One camp, generally associated with conservative
thinkers (“conservative consumer welfare”), claims that consumer welfare
means allocative economic efficiency116 and should capture both profits—
the welfare of producers—and consumer wellbeing.117 A group of
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progressive antitrust scholars (“progressive consumer welfare”) argues that
consumer welfare, as Congress meant it, means protecting consumers from
the wealth transfers associated with the higher prices from monopolies,
oligopolies, and cartels.118
Notwithstanding their differences, both
interpretations are rooted in the logic of neoclassical economics and focus
on the short-run material effects of market power.119
Progressive consumer welfare has much stronger historical support
than the conservative conception. The progressive understanding of
consumer welfare has deep grounding in the legislative histories of the FTC
Act as well as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.120 Although they did not
conceive of antitrust in the technical terms of economics, the members of
Congress and Senators involved in drafting and debating the FTC Act
aimed to prevent powerful corporations from exacting overcharges on and
thereby transferring wealth from the consuming public.121 In contrast, they
showed no intent to advance the goal of conservative consumer welfare.122
While progressive consumer welfare is anchored in the legislative
history of the FTC Act, protecting consumers from anticompetitive
overcharges is only one of the goals that Congress had in creating the
Commission in 1914. Congress did not express a solely consumerist
purpose. It conceived of the antitrust laws as political and social statutes,
not pure economic measures.123
Along with preventing powerful
businesses from exacting wealth from consumers, two other themes
dominated the debates leading to the passage of the FTC Act. First, the
members of Congress who drafted the statute wanted to prevent dominant
businesses from using their power to drive out smaller rivals and close
markets to competitors.124 They believed that monopolists and oligopolists
had to be checked through federal legislation because they had the raw

05/11/2017 10:58:06

C M
Y K

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 78 Side A

PERSPECTIVES 155, 156-59 (2007) (arguing that antitrust laws should maximize total
surplus, not just consumer surplus).
118. See, e.g., Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust
Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 336, 336-38 (2009) (placing the emphasis on consumer harm rather than an aggregated
standard including seller welfare).
119. See John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent”
and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 264 (1988)
(noting that both conservative and progressive consumer welfare advocates utilize “latterday economic theory” to parse congressional intent in the Sherman Act).
120. See generally Lande, supra note 73 (discussing the desire to prevent unfair wealth
transfers as a common goal behind the various antitrust statutes).
121. Lande, supra note 73, at 112-13.
122. See Flynn, supra note 119, at 299.
123. Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial Organization,
16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 487-88 (1983).
124. See supra Section II.a.
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power to control markets and represented an existential threat to small
businesses and entrepreneurs.125 Second, the authors of the FTC Act sought
to forestall concentrations of private power.126 They feared that corporate
giants threatened to undermine American democracy and transform the
institutions of the state into their servants.127
In endorsing the language of “consumer welfare,” the Section 5
Statement failed to honor Congress’s aims in enacting the FTC Act. At
best, the FTC fulfilled only one of the goals Congress set out in its
founding statute. Even if the Commission embraces progressive consumer
welfare, it would still not do justice to what Congress intended. The
Commission would disregard the other two principal objectives that
Congress envisioned. The Section 5 Statement did not acknowledge the
Congressional aims of maintaining open markets and preventing the
concentration of private power. It focused exclusively and narrowly on the
economic well-being of consumers while ignoring the political and social
objectives of the FTC Act. In a speech to announce the publication of the
Section 5 Statement, Chairwoman Edith Ramirez stressed the focus on
consumer welfare and seemed to disparage the political and social aims of
the FTC Act as “public policy concerns unrelated to competition.”128 As
former FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky wrote, this disregard for the
political goals of antitrust is “bad history, bad policy, and bad law.”129
B. The FTC Endorsed a Legal Standard that Grants Powerful
Businesses Carte Blanche to Control Markets
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125. See supra Section II.a.
126. See supra Section II.a.
127. See supra Section II.a.
128. Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at Competition Law
Center at George Washington University Law School 5 (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735411/150813section5spee
ch.pdf [https://perma.cc/UAH6-K4E2].
129. Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051
(1979).
130. Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition”
Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 57,056, 57,056 (Sept.
21, 2015). Chairwoman Ramirez stated that the rule of reason in the Section 5 Statement
should be understood in “its broad, modern sense.” Ramirez, supra note 125, at 7. She
added that this means that “the rule of reason does not ‘necessarily . . . call for the fullest
market analysis’ in all cases.” Ramirez, supra note 128, at 7. While the FTC could analyze
a range of conduct under the truncated rule of reason or even presumptions of illegality, it is
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Along with adopting the narrow goal of consumer welfare, the FTC
stated that its Section 5 cases would rely on “a framework similar to the
rule of reason.”130 The rule of reason requires a deep investigation of the
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relevant industry and credible evidence of actual or likely anticompetitive
outcomes, defined today to mean higher prices or reduced economic
output.131 For a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under the rule of
reason, it must typically show actual or likely anticompetitive effects from
the conduct being challenged.132 When a plaintiff demonstrates likely
anticompetitive effects, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut this
showing through the presentation of efficiencies and other business
justifications from the conduct.133 The plaintiff can then either rebut the
justification (restraint does not promote procompetitive benefits or there are
substantially less restrictive alternatives) or show that the anticompetitive
effects outweigh the procompetitive benefits.134 Rather than merely
“similar,” the Section 5 Statement’s high-level description of the rule of
reason appears to be virtually identical to the long-standing interpretation
of the rule of reason.135
The rule of reason stands in contrast to per se and presumption of
illegality. In the rules versus standards dichotomy, the rule of reason is
antitrust law’s standards-based framework, whereas presumptive illegality
and especially per se illegality are more rules-oriented.136 Starting in the
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likely to use simpler iterations of the rule of reason sparingly. Ramirez emphasized that the
Section 5 Statement is an expression of continuity with the past, rather than a break with it.
Ramirez, supra note 128, at 10. In laying out a streamlined version of the rule of reason,
Ramirez cites the FTC’s “quick look” rule of reason in the context of conduct resembling
collusion. Ramirez, supra note 128, at 8. This is a telling example. Over the past three
decades, the FTC has applied a truncated rule of reason analysis to horizontal restraints on
price and non-price competition. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming FTC’s decision that agreements between competitors to restrict
price cutting and advertising is inherently suspect). Elsewhere, the FTC has relied on the
full-blown rule of reason. See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 842 (11th Cir.
2015) (upholding FTC’s decision that a monopolist’s exclusive dealing was illegal under a
full rule of reason analysis). Treating it as an affirmation of FTC practice over the past
several decades, the Section 5 Statement should be seen as leaving some space for simpler
legal standards for collusion-like conduct but requiring full market analysis for mergers,
monopolies, and vertical restraints.
131. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87
(2007) (identifying the rule of reason as the standard for determining whether a practice
restrains trade and discussing the factors that are considered).
132. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 59.
134. Id.
135. See Section 5 Statement, 80 Fed. Reg. at 57,056 (“[T]he act or practice will be
evaluated under a framework similar to the rule of reason, that is, an act or practice
challenged by the Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to competition or the
competitive process, taking into account any associated cognizable efficiencies and business
justifications . . . .”).
136. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49 (2007).
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late 1970s, the courts, in their antitrust decisions, shifted decisively away
from rules and toward standards and held that most types of business
conduct should be analyzed under balancing tests like the rule of reason.137
The federal antitrust agencies have adopted a similar analytical framework,
one reliant on fact-driven inquiries, for addressing antitrust concerns in
mergers.138 The Supreme Court has held that the rule of reason is now the
default analytical tool in antitrust cases.139 Today, only price fixing, market
division, and bid rigging between rivals remain per se illegal.140
1.

The Rule of Reason Is Not Equipped to Advance Consumer
Welfare

The rule of reason requires a case-by-case balancing that is beyond the
capability of federal antitrust enforcers, let alone generalist courts. For
example, how can the FTC or a court credibly balance the short-term loss
of price competition from a horizontal merger against the realization of
longer-term dynamic efficiencies?141 This task calls for “speculative,
possibly labyrinthine, and unnecessary”142 analysis and appears to be
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137. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312, 314 (2007) (holding that a two-pronged reasonableness test that applied to predatory
pricing claims also applied to predatory bidding actions); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3,
10-15 (1997) (reviewing the Supreme Court’s previous decisions regarding the rule of
reason and highlighting the reluctance to adopt per se rules).
138. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES
(2010),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E623-FVNT] (outlining the analytical techniques used to address antitrust
concerns following a merger or acquisition).
139. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.
140. See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1998) (summarizing the
Supreme Court’s decisions with respect to horizontal and vertical price-fixing while
highlighting its status as per se illegal); see also Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc. 498 U.S. 46,
49-50 (1990) (finding that a market division agreement between rivals was illegal “on its
face”). Some types of collusion-like behavior have been deemed presumptively illegal,
under the so-called quick look test, in multiple Supreme Court and lower court rulings. See,
e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10 (1984) (stating that a
demonstration of anticompetitive behavior does not need to rely on “a detailed market
analysis”); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2008)
(finding that a quick-look analysis was an appropriate way to determine the “net
anticompetitive effects” were obvious); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (finding a restraint presumptively unlawful because of obviousness).
141. See generally Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of
Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1442 (2009) (suggesting that judicial fact-finders are
not capable of assigning values to short and long term efficiencies because of feasibility and
consistency concerns).
142. Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95 MINN. L. REV.
59, 87 (2010).
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beyond the capacities of even the most able institutional actors. Before the
adoption of the efficiency paradigm, the Supreme Court cited the practical
impossibility of measuring and balancing costs and benefits in declining to
apply the rule of reason to certain types of business conduct. In United
States v. Topco Associates, the Court acknowledged its institutional
limitations when asked to make legislative-type determinations:
There have been tremendous departures from the notion of a freeenterprise system as it was originally conceived in this country.
These departures have been the product of congressional action
and the will of the people. If a decision is to be made to sacrifice
competition in one portion of the economy for greater
competition in another portion, this too is a decision that must be
made by Congress and not by private forces or by the courts.
Private forces are too keenly aware of their own interests in
making such decisions and courts are ill-equipped and ill-situated
for such decisionmaking. To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would
surely be brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the
delicate judgment on the relative values to society of competitive
areas of the economy, the judgment of the elected representatives
of the people is required.143
In more recent times, Justice Breyer has raised similar administrative
objections to applying the rule of reason to resale price maintenance
agreements.144
While in theory calling for an impossible intellectual inquiry, the rule
of reason, in practice, functions as a standard of “de facto legality.”145 By
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143. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972).
144. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 916
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“How easily can courts identify instances in which the
benefits are likely to outweigh potential harms? My own answer is, not very easily. For one
thing, it is often difficult to identify who—producer or dealer—is the moving force behind
any given resale price maintenance agreement. Suppose, for example, several large
multibrand [sic] retailers all sell resale-price-maintained products. Suppose further that
small producers set retail prices because they fear that, otherwise, the large retailers will
favor (say, by allocating better shelf space) the goods of other producers who practice resale
price maintenance. Who ‘initiated’ this practice, the retailers hoping for considerable
insulation from retail competition, or the producers, who simply seek to deal best with the
circumstances they find? For another thing, as I just said, it is difficult to determine just
when, and where, the ‘free riding’ problem is serious enough to warrant legal protection.”).
145. See Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of
Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67 (1991) (analyzing how the rule of reason analysis has been
applied by federal courts of appeals to vertical non-price constraints). Judge Posner has
similarly described the rule of reason as a “euphemism for nonliability.” Richard A. Posner,
The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977).
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endorsing the rule of reason, the FTC has given powerful businesses broad
freedom to dominate markets, whether through mergers, exclusionary
conduct, or other anticompetitive practices. The rule of reason imposes
heavy burdens on plaintiffs and, correspondingly, establishes a strong
presumption of legality for even competitively suspect conduct by firms
with market power.
In adopting the rule of reason, the FTC practically guaranteed that it
would be able to bring few, if any, Section 5 cases. The statistics
demonstrate, in practice, that the rule of reason means that the plaintiff
almost always loses. A leading study found that, between 2000 and 2009,
defendants received a favorable court ruling in more than ninety-five
percent of antitrust cases implicating the rule of reason.146
In the merger context, a growing body of evidence shows that
insisting on rule of reason style analysis comes at a significant cost to
consumers. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines assume that mergers
generally enhance efficiency.147 This pro-merger assumption seems to rest
on a thin bed of evidence. In the manufacturing sector, mergers, instead of
creating efficiencies, have led to enhanced market power, as seen in higher
price-cost markups.148 Furthermore, the assumption that markets with low
or moderate concentration (as defined by the Horizontal Merger
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146. Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 828 (2009).
147. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at § 10 (“[A] primary
benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies and
thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower
prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.”).
148. See Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on
Market Power and Efficiency 24 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2016082, 2016) (finding significant evidence of increased average markups from M&A activity
in manufacturing industries); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and
Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 873-79 (2011) (discussing sources and
studies that suggest “certain categories of mergers destroy shareholder value and do little, if
anything, to create meaningful efficiencies or to enhance market competition”). See also
Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More
Concentrated? 41 (2016) (“This paper documents that over the last 15 years the level of
product market concentration in the US has increased across most industries. This
phenomenon has been fueled by consolidation of public firms into mega firms. We show
that the increase in concentration levels has implications to firm performance, as it affects
profitability, investment, and returns to investors. First, the increase in industry
concentration levels is associated with remaining firms generating higher profits through
higher profit margins. The results suggest that the increase in profit margin cannot be
attributed to increased efficiency but rather to increased market power. Second, mergers in
concentrated industries enjoy more positive market reactions, consistent with the idea that
market power considerations are becoming a key source of value during these corporate
events. Finally, firms in concentrated industries experience significant abnormal stock
returns, suggesting that considerable portion of the gains accrues to shareholders.”).

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 81 Side A

05/11/2017 10:58:06

4_VAHEESAN_TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/9/17 5:34 PM

THE LATENT POWER OF THE FTC

671

Guidelines) are not conducive to collusion149 appears empirically suspect.
Contrary to this assumption, price fixing and other collusive conduct has
been uncovered in many unconcentrated markets.150
John Kwoka’s research has raised further questions about whether the
fact-intensive merger review process promotes consumer welfare.
Kwoka’s meta-analysis of merger retrospective studies found that the
antitrust agencies failed to act against more than sixty percent of the
studied mergers that resulted in price increases.151 In a separate study,
Kwoka found that simple structural presumptions, such as the market share
of the merging parties and combined market share of the leading firms,
have a high rate of accuracy in predicting which mergers lead to short-term
consumer harm.152 These findings cast doubt on the need for open-ended,
time-consuming investigations of horizontal mergers in already
concentrated markets.153
2. The Rule of Reason’s Deficiencies Become Even More Acute
Under Progressive-Populist Antitrust
The problems with the rule of reason become only more severe under
the antitrust goals articulated by Congress. This progressive-populist
philosophy seeks to protect consumers and producers from powerful sellers
and purchasers, maintain open markets, and prevent the accumulation of
private power. The rule of reason also fails to advance the incipiency
standard in Section 5. Even if the FTC had adopted the goals Congress laid
out in 1914 in its Section 5 Statement, the rule of reason would foreclose
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149. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at § 5.3 (“Mergers resulting
in unconcentrated markets are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects and ordinarily
require no further analysis.”).
150. Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the TwentyFirst Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 555-56 (2007).
151. JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE
ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 155 (2014).
152. See John Kwoka, The Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger
Review: False Positives, or Unwarranted Concerns? 48 (Ne. Univ. Dep’t of Econ.,
Working Paper, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2782152
[https://perma.cc/2KN2-K9SX] (finding that structural presumptions of illegality are highly
accurate in identifying anticompetitive mergers under the consumer welfare standard).
153. While appearing to fail consumers, the current merger review process is an
important source of income for economists and lawyers who specialize in merger analysis
and have experience at one of the federal antitrust agencies. See generally Jesse Eisinger &
Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More Than a Thousand Bucks an Hour Peddling
Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/theseprofessors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour-peddling-mega-mergers
[https://perma.cc/UA6V-KC8P] (discussing the high earnings of professors who are hired
by large companies to rebut concerns of increased market power from corporate mergers).
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154. See Stucke, supra note 1, at 620 (suggesting that the rule of reason is not consistent
with enforcement of antitrust policy’s traditional goals).
155. Averitt, supra note 51, at 243 (discussing comments by members of Congress
aspiring to stop monopolies in their infancies).
156. See Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, Antitrust Review of the AT&T/T-Mobile
Transaction, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 47, 58 (2011) (explaining how the incipiency standard
cannot be honored under an effects-based approach).
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the realization of these aims.
The original aims of the FTC Act are not susceptible to quantification
and balancing. How could the FTC balance incommensurable things such
as short-term price effects against enhanced corporate power in the political
system? The absurdity of this type of balancing is evident on its face.
These are qualitative determinations that call for legislative-type
judgments, not a futile quantification exercise. The rule of reason compels
the FTC to focus its lens narrowly: it must concentrate on quantifiable,
short-term harms (from, for example, mergers) and ignore qualitative and
longer-term harms in their entirety.154
In eschewing per se rules and presumptions in favor of the rule of
reason, the FTC also contradicted the incipiency principle of Section 5. In
enacting the FTC Act, Congress aspired to prevent monopolies and
oligopolies from dominating markets in the first place, rather than
restructure them after they had emerged and become entrenched.155 This
prophylactic, or incipient, purpose recognized that prevention of
competitive problems is more effective than curing them after the fact.
Congress believed that once a corporation has become a monopolist it may
be very difficult, if not impossible, to restructure the firm and restore
competitive market conditions.
The current rule of reason practically bars early interdiction against
anticompetitive conduct and permits action against dominant firms only in
a very limited set of circumstances. Given the hazards of predicting the
future, long-term anticompetitive effects are difficult, if not impossible, to
prove in court. In insisting on the showing of likely anticompetitive
effects, the rule of reason undercuts the incipiency standard.156 These
effects can be shown only after a corporation’s anticompetitive strategy has
fulfilled its objective of enhanced market power or, at best, when the
strategy is on the cusp of fulfilling its objective. The rule of reason, by
requiring the showing of anticompetitive effects, demands that plaintiffs
wait and grant anticompetitive conduct the opportunity to blossom and
even flourish.
Some antitrust decisions have gone even further in raising the bar for
plaintiffs in rule of reason cases. In the area of monopolization, for
example, some courts have adopted a restrictive effects-based approach
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that requires plaintiffs to show that the excluded rival(s) had the capability
of providing short-term price competition against the defendant.157 In
practical terms, under this standard dominant firms can be held liable only
for excluding rivals that have comparable cost structures—an unlikely
possibility for most new entrants and small rivals.158 If excluded rivals are
required to show that they are “worthy” of antitrust protection under this
cost-based screen, monopolists are given “free reign to squash nascent,
albeit unproven, competitors at will.”159
IV.

HOW THE FTC CAN HONOR CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND
RESTORE PROGRESSIVE-POPULIST ANTITRUST LAW

Given its effective lawmaking authority over Section 5, the FTC can
still change course and embrace the vision Congress established for Section
5. A critical first step is for the Commission to repudiate the ahistorical,
discredited efficiency paradigm. Moreover, many scholars who believe in
antitrust enforcement oppose the rule of reason as the primary legal
standard.160 Chief Justice Roberts has also criticized the rule of reason for
its complexity.161
In place of the crabbed efficiency vision of a once expansive body of
law, the FTC should look to the goals expressed by the members of
Congress and Senators that created it: the protection of consumers and
producers from firms with market power, the preservation of open markets,
and the dispersal of private economic and political power. Even a century
after the FTC’s founding, these goals (a “citizen interest” rather than a
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157. See Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 909 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the primary “anticompetitive danger” posed by “multi-product bundled
discount[s]” and the requirements a plaintiff challenging the discount must meet); see also
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better
Balance, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 3, 59-60 (2004) (laying out deficiencies for the “equally
efficient competitor” standard while suggesting it “could harm consumer welfare”).
158. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 253, 321 (2003) (discussing means of constraining rival efficiency without ever
driving them out of the market).
159. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
160. E.g., Stucke, supra note 141; Cudahy & Devlin supra note 142.
161. See F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“[A]lthough the question posed by this case is fundamentally a question of patent law—i.e.,
whether Solvay’s patent was valid and therefore permitted Solvay to pay competitors to
honor the scope of its patent—the majority declares that such questions should henceforth
be scrutinized by antitrust law’s unruly rule of reason. Good luck to the district courts that
must, when faced with a patent settlement, weigh the ‘likely anticompetitive effects,
redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting legal considerations present in
the circumstances.’”).
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“consumer welfare” standard)162 are as relevant as ever, and arguably even
more so today.163 The proposed interpretation would follow a venerable
canon of statutory interpretation, looking to the legislative history of a law
to articulate the meaning of general statutory text,164 and would be much
more defensible than consulting the dated economic musings of legal
scholars for guidance.
To advance the citizen interest standard, the FTC should interpret
Section 5 to cover a range of high risk conduct, some of which is treated
very leniently at present.
Specifically, the FTC should establish
presumptions of illegality for mergers in concentrated markets, certain
types of conduct by firms with market power, and vertical restraints that
limit retail competition and challenge durable or otherwise harmful
possession of market power. Simpler and stronger doctrine must be
accompanied by simpler and stronger remedies for Section 5 violations. In
remedying anticompetitive behavior, the FTC should generally favor onetime structural remedies over complicated behavioral fixes.
A. The FTC Should Anchor Section 5 in the Congressionally
Expressed Goals of the Statute
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162. Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 9, at 276.
163. See Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A
Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CON. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 41 (2014) (describing how large
corporations have “(1) the power to set policy, (2) the power to regulate, and (3) the power
to tax”).
164. E.g., Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 35, 40 (1990) (applying
“traditional tools of statutory construction” including review of legislative history). One
common application of Chevron looks beyond statutory text and examines legislative
history to determine whether a statute is ambiguous. Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed
Chevron Experiment Now: How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be
Overruled, 42 CONN. L. REV. 779, 818 (2010). Under this less deferential formulation of
Chevron, the proposed interpretation of Section 5 would still rest on a solid legal basis,
whereas the efficiency interpretation would not. See supra Part II.A.
165. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 50 (1978).
166. Id. at 9.
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Before specific legal rules can be formulated, the FTC must revisit the
goals of antitrust law in general and Section 5 in particular. In helping
overthrow the historical understanding of antitrust, Robert Bork himself
recognized that the identification of the goals of the legal regime is the
essential first step. He wrote that one must first ask, “What is the point of
the law—what are its goals? Everything else follows from the answer we
give.”165 Bork looked to the legislative histories of the antitrust statutes and
incorrectly claimed that they establish allocative efficiency as the only goal
of antitrust enforcement.166
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The efficiency or consumer welfare goals that have dominated
antitrust for the past two generations neither reflect the objectives of
Congress nor address the structural problems in today’s economy.
Congress, in creating the FTC, had a number of aims. To be sure, the
protection of consumers was an aim, but it was only one of several aims.
The Congress that enacted the FTC Act sought to protect consumers,
producers, competitors, and political institutions from concentrated private
power.167 These goals are not just a historical artifact. The growing public
concerns about monopoly and oligopoly in the American economy extend
beyond higher consumer prices.168
They also include diminished
opportunities for entrepreneurs due to closed markets and the subversion of
democracy by businesses with market power. In short, the fears being
expressed today—increasing concentration,169 fewer new businesses,170
increasing wealth inequality,171 and more profits concentrated in fewer
firms172—bear a striking resemblance to those that Congress voiced more
than a century ago.
The FTC must renounce the narrow efficiency paradigm and
reembrace the broad vision of Congress. The efficiency paradigm is an
ahistorical innovation developed in the 1960s and 1970s. It reflects the
empirically-deficient ideologies of some economists and lawyers, not the
goals of Congress in 1914 or 1890, not the goals when the Clayton Act was
amended after World War II, and not even the implicit goals of Congress
when the FTC Act was amended in the 1980s.173 Perpetuating an ill-
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167. See supra part II.A.
168. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 3, at 2-4 (blaming market concentration for the lack
of consumer choice, barriers to competition, the dearth of small businesses, “concentrated
political power,” and the decline of the middle class).
169. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND INDICATORS
OF MARKET POWER 4 (2016) (noting that increased industry concentration is an indication of
lower competition).
170. See Ian Hathaway & Robert E. Litan, What’s Driving the Decline in the Firm
Formation Rate? A Partial Explanation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (2014),
http://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/driving_decline_firm_formation_
rate_hathaway_litan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BFX-V6WN].
171. See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013).
172. See supra at note 6.
173. See May, supra note 73, at 286-300 (citing traditional economic theory as the
driving force behind antitrust laws, rather than firm efficiency). Eleanor M. Fox, The
Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1150 (1981)
(“The legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Amendment speaks clearly and
overwhelmingly of the social evils of ‘concentration.’ The legislators who supported the
Amendment did so on grounds of the dangers of increasing economic concentration, not on
grounds of the virtues of efficiency.”); Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 263 (explaining that
Congress amended the FTC’s consumer protection authority to comply with the logic of
neoclassical economics but did not cabin its competition authority in the same manner).
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defined efficiency goal with the rule of reason subverts the intentions of
Congress. By embracing efficiency, the FTC has allowed what Congress
feared to come to fruition: oligopolistic and monopolistic markets that
harm consumers, restrict entry, and undermine democratic institutions. The
FTC must anchor its advocacy, enforcement, and rulemaking in the everrelevant aims of Congress: 1) the protection of consumers and sellers (such
as farmers) from wealth transfers due to firm market power, 2) the
preservation of open markets, and 3) the dispersal of private economic and
political power.
B. The FTC Should Establish Presumptions Against Competitively
Suspect Conduct
To advance Congress’s goals in enacting Section 5, the FTC should
establish presumptions of illegality for competitively suspicious conduct.
Continued reliance on the rule of reason means continued antitrust
dormancy.
Just consider the death of Section 2 (anti-monopoly)
enforcement by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”).174 While this decline in
the number of DOJ Section 2 cases has multiple causes, the pro-defendant
legal standards are likely a major factor.175 If the FTC is to effectuate
Congressional intent, it must reject the rule of reason and adopt a series of
presumptions of illegality for conduct that can injure consumers and
producers, exclude rivals, and concentrate private power. The FTC already
applies presumptions of illegality to conduct resembling collusion.176 It,
however, should go further and apply presumptions to a much broader set
of competitively suspect behavior.

05/11/2017 10:58:06

C M
Y K

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 83 Side B

174. Compare ANTITRUST DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 2006–2015 5,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/788426/download [https://perma.cc/FGJ7-9H4Q] (showing
that only one monopoly case was filed in court between 2006 and 2015), with ANTITRUST
DIVISION, WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1970–1979 4, https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2009/06/09/215792.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M6VU-AVTR]
(indicating that fifteen monopoly and oligopoly cases were filed in 1971 alone).
175. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
90 B.U. L. REV. 1611, 1613 (2010). While plaintiffs face unfavorable legal standards in
monopolization cases, some have still won important victories in this trying legal
environment. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 303 (3rd Cir. 2012)
(affirming jury verdict finding defendant liable for anticompetitive exclusive dealing); Spirit
Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 953 (6th Cir. 2005) (vacating district
court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant accused of predatory pricing).
176. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 37 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(affirming FTC’s decision that agreements between competitors to restrict price cutting and
advertising is inherently suspect); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 36263 (5th Cir. 2008) (concluding that “quick-look analysis” was appropriate for evaluating
price fixing-like conduct).
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The FTC has flexibility over how to develop these legal standards.177
It can create them through case-by-case adjudication, which has been the
agency’s primary policymaking vehicle over the past few decades.178 It can
also establish Section 5 antitrust legal standards through rulemakings.179
Also, the choice of whether to proceed through adjudication or rulemaking
does not affect the level of deference that courts would accord to an FTC
interpretation of Section 5.
Interpretations made through either
adjudication or rulemaking are generally entitled to Chevron deference.180
On the competition side, the FTC’s rulemaking authority has not been
changed in the multiple post-1970s Congressional amendments to the FTC
Act.181 The FTC can issue competition rules under the standard notice-andcomment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act. An FTC
competition rule would not have to comply with the more onerous
Magnuson-Moss Act procedures required for consumer protection rules.182
As to specific practices, the FTC should hold mergers in concentrated
markets, conduct with exclusionary potential by dominant and neardominant firms, and vertical restraints on retail and other distributional
competition to be presumptively illegal. These types of conduct can harm
consumers and producers, unfairly exclude rivals and new entrants, and
concentrate private power. To prevent these harms instead of correct them
after the fact, the FTC should establish presumptions of illegality for a
range of competitively problematic conduct.
By replacing the costly and time-consuming rule of reason and other
open-ended standards,183 these presumptions of illegality would discourage
anticompetitive conduct and establish quasi-bright lines as to permissible
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177. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
178. Hayley Tsukayama, FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez Chats About Privacy,
Security
and
Why
She’s
At
CES,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
6,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/01/06/ftc-chairwoman-edithramirez-chats-about-privacy-security-and-why-shes-at-ces/?utm_term=.df0f4f06b860
[https://perma.cc/6LKD-GA7U] (describing FTC as “mainly a law enforcement agency”).
179. The D.C. Circuit has held that the FTC has rulemaking authority under Section 5.
Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 697-98 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
180. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-30 (2001) (“We have
recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that
produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).
181. See Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 233-37 (tracing the FTC’s Section 5 rulemaking
power from National Petroleum Refiners Ass’n through the 1994 FTC Reauthorization).
182. While Congress has modified the FTC’s rulemaking power under its consumer
protection authority since 1973, it has not modified this power for the Commission’s
antitrust authority. See Hurwitz, supra note 30, at 251 (“Congress has expressly
acknowledged, discussed, and declined to alter this power in the context of Section 5’s
prohibition against unfair methods of competition.”).
183. Stucke, supra note 141, at 1461-63.
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and impermissible conduct.184 At the same time, these presumptions would
not amount to categorical prohibitions of the enumerated practices. Rather,
they would shift the burden of proof to firms that engage in competitively
suspicious behavior and invite them to rebut the presumption of illegality
through the showing of credible business justifications.
1. Mergers
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184. See generally Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with
Optimally Differentiated Rules Instead of “Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason”, 2 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215 (2006) (favoring rule differentiation over case-by-case
adjudication). Proceedings under the proposed presumptions would not necessarily be as
expeditious and straightforward as those under per se rules because, in some cases, market
definitions and efficiencies would call for fact-intensive inquiries. Stucke, supra note 141,
at 1461-62.
185. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at §§ 6-7.
186. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 138, at § 1.
187. See, e.g., Marc Jarsulic et al., Reviving Antitrust: Why Our Economy Needs a
Progressive Competition Policy, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 16 (June 2016),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/28143212/
RevivingAntitrust.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVY7-88QP] (suggesting that studies showed
increased opportunities for anticompetitive effects following vertical integration).
188. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963).
189. Id.
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Mergers in concentrated markets have serious anticompetitive
potential. These corporate consolidations can raise consumer prices by
eliminating head-to-head competition and facilitating both express and
implicit collusion.185 Mergers can also enhance the consolidating entities’
power to exclude rivals.186 While vertical mergers are assumed to be less
harmful than horizontal mergers, they can also have serious anticompetitive
effects. For example, in markets with strong network effects, a dominant
firm in one market can acquire a firm in an adjacent market, foreclose
rivals from this market, and dictate the long-term development of the entire
sector.187 Furthermore, the concentration of private power should not be
ignored. Mergers of all kinds—horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate—
concentrate the control of economic and political power in fewer hands.
To prevent the harms from horizontal mergers, the FTC should use its
Section 5 authority to adopt a strong presumption of illegality for mergers
in concentrated markets. The FTC should look to Supreme Court
precedent for guidance here. The Supreme Court has held that a horizontal
merger that would result in the merged entity having a share of greater than
thirty percent is presumptively illegal.188 The Court intimated that a merger
involving parties with a combined market share of twenty percent may also
be presumptively illegal.189 Philadelphia National Bank arose in the
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190. Id. at 335.
191. See Stucke, supra note 150, at 555-56 (observing collusion in many moderately
concentrated and unconcentrated markets).
192. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 328 (1962) (“Since the
diminution of the vigor of competition which may stem from a vertical arrangement results
primarily from a foreclosure of a share of the market otherwise open to competitors, an
important consideration in determining whether the effect of a vertical arrangement ‘may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly’ is the size of the share
of the market foreclosed. However, this factor will seldom be determinative.”).
193. See, e.g., Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the
Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C
265) 6, 9 (“The Commission is unlikely to find concern in non-horizontal mergers, be it of a
coordinated or of a non-coordinated nature, where the market share post-merger of the new
entity in each of the markets concerned is below 30% and the post-merger HHI is below
2000.”).
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context of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, not Section 5.190 The FTC should
recognize the broader substantive reach of the Section 5 and adopt a
presumption of illegality at no higher than the twenty percent threshold.191
In the area of vertical mergers, the FTC should also establish a
comparable presumption of illegality. The Supreme Court has not
established bright lines concerning vertical mergers, as it has with
horizontal mergers.192 Although the FTC does not have comparable
precedential guidance in this area, it can use its investigatory and research
powers to understand the dynamics of vertical mergers and determine the
point at which vertical mergers threaten to raise prices and exclude rivals.
At a minimum, the FTC should deem vertical acquisitions by dominant or
near-dominant firms to be presumptively illegal, regardless of the size of
the acquired firm. In addition, a merger between a firm with a thirty
percent or greater market share in one market and another firm with a thirty
percent or greater share in an adjacent market could be subject to a
presumption of illegality.193
Under the proposed presumptions, parties would have the opportunity
to rebut a prima facie case of illegality through the showing of business
justifications. Parties to these combinations could rebut the presumption by
showing that the merger is the least restrictive means to achieve a particular
legitimate business goal. For example, they could demonstrate that the
merger is necessary to develop new product lines. The presumption would
be strong and difficult to rebut. If the acquirer could reasonably achieve its
purported objectives through means less threatening to competition, such as
internal expansion, the presumption of illegality would not be overcome.
Conversely, if the acquirer can establish that the merger is the least
restrictive way to realize the objectives, it could rebut the presumption of
illegality.
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2. Dominant Firm Conduct
Dominant and would-be dominant firms can resort to a variety of
practices to exclude competitors while maintaining or enhancing their
market power. Monopolists and near-monopolists can use exclusive
dealing and market share penalties or rebates to prevent rivals from
accessing consumers or essential distribution channels.194 They can also
resort to predatory pricing whereby they use short periods of below-cost
pricing to exclude competitors and deter possible entrants from
participating in the market.195 In addition, they can engage in tying—
conditioning the purchase of a product in which they have monopoly power
on the purchase of a related product in a competitive market as a means of
extending their market power into this second market.196
While
exclusionary tactics cannot be cataloged exhaustively, these are some of the
anticompetitive practices that have been used over time in a variety of
industries.
For dominant and near-dominant firms, the FTC should establish
presumptions of illegality for particular types of conduct with exclusionary
potential. To further the incipiency standard of Section 5, these special
presumptions should apply to both firms on the threshold of dominance,
and firms with established market dominance. A market share greater than
or equal to forty percent would seem to be a reasonable cutoff. For firms in
this category, the FTC should adopt presumptions of illegality for, among
other practices, exclusive dealing, market-share discounts, and predatory
pricing. Dominant and near-dominant firms that engaged in these practices
would be presumptively in violation of Section 5. The FTC would be
following the logic of the existing Sherman Act approach to tying.197
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194. See Steven C. Salop, Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Vertical Conduct: Where
Chicago Has Overshot the Mark, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 141,
150 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (suggesting that competition for exclusives creates
competitive constraints on market participants and can lead to the exclusion of rivals).
195. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light
of the Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 84-94 (2015) (discussing suspected
and confirmed predatory pricing practices by dominant firms in the twentieth century).
196. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 417-20 (2009).
197. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15-18 (1984)
(stating that the validity of a tying arrangement should be determined by assessing whether
consumers are forced to accept the tying arrangement through the sellers’ market power);
see also Collins Inkjet Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 781 F.3d 264, 271-72 (6th Cir. 2015)
(citations omitted) (“The tie falls foul of antitrust law if the seller has appreciable economic
power in the tying product market and the arrangement affects a substantial volume of
commerce in the tied market. . . . A tying arrangement that falls foul of these criteria and
lacks a valid business justification is anticompetitive because it tends to force more efficient
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A presumption of illegality based on a market share would recognize
that the competitive implications of a particular form of conduct depend on
the power of the entity practicing it. For example, below-cost pricing by a
firm with a fifty percent share of the market has radically different
competitive implications than below-cost pricing by a recent entrant with
just five percent of the market.198 The former has serious exclusionary
potential, while the latter is much more likely to be competitively benign.199
Similar logic distinguishes exclusive dealing practiced by a
monopolist or other dominant firm from exclusive dealing practice by a
firm with a small market share. The FTC has already recognized the
competitive threat of monopolists’ use of exclusive arrangements with
distributors. Between 2008 and 2016, the FTC brought many enforcement
actions against monopolists that insisted on exclusivity arrangements with
distributors.200
The Commission recognized that under these
circumstances, exclusive dealing threatened to exclude competitors and
injure consumers in the short and long run.201 Given this enforcement
record and collective body of evidence, exclusive dealing by dominant
firms appears to be an obvious target for further policy development by the
FTC. A future FTC should establish, through either an enforcement action
or rulemaking, that exclusive dealing by dominant and near-dominant firms
is presumptively illegal under Section 5.
Under these presumptions of illegality, firms would have the
opportunity to present business justifications to rebut the FTC’s prima facie
case of anticompetitive conduct. They could overcome the presumption by
showing that the practice is necessary to achieve a legitimate business aim
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competitors out of the tied product market.”).
198. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Behavior that might otherwise not be of concern to the antitrust
laws—or that might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take on exclusionary
connotations when practiced by a monopolist.”).
199. Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 99-100.
200. E.g., McWane, Inc. v FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 842 (11th Cir. 2015) (affirming FTC
decision that producer of domestic pipe fittings used exclusive dealing to improperly
exclude competing domestic manufacturers of ductile iron pipe fittings); In re IDEXX
Labs., Inc., 155 F.T.C. 241, 242 (2013) (alleging that the respondent used exclusive dealing
to foreclose market access to rival manufacturers of veterinary diagnostic products); In re
Pool Corp., F.T.C. No. 101-0115, 2012 WL 159752, at *6-7 (Jan. 10, 2012) (settling
allegations the respondent used exclusive dealing to marginalize rival pool product
distributors); In re Transitions Optical, Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1281, 1325 (2010) (settling
allegations that respondent’s exclusive dealing with lens casters foreclosed rival
photochromic lens makers from market).
201. See, e.g., In re Transitions Optical, Inc., 149 F.T.C. at 1317 (foreclosure of “rivals
from key distribution channels” reduced competition and led to “higher prices, lower output,
reduced innovation and diminished consumer choice”).
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and that the practice is the least restrictive means of doing so. For
example, a firm with a market share in excess of forty percent that engaged
in a period of below-cost pricing could rebut the presumption of illegality
by showing that this pricing practice was necessary and the least restrictive
means of implementing a learning-by-doing strategy to lower long-term
costs of production.202 The presumption would be strong and could only be
overcome through the presentation of specific, credible evidence, not just
assertions about theoretical efficiencies.
3. Vertical Restraints
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202. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2280-81 (1999) (outlining several
viable proof of efficiencies defenses that could rebut the presumption of illegality).
203. Marina Lao, Free Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for
Resale Price Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 196, 21011 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008).
204. Robert L. Steiner, How Manufacturers Deal with the Price-Cutting Retailer: When
Are Vertical Restraints Efficient?, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 407, 441-42 (1997).
205. Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider
Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 509 (2010).
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Distributional
restraints
have
immediate
and
long-term
anticompetitive effects, lack empirically validated business justifications,
and so should be subject to a presumption of illegality under Section 5.
Practices such as resale price maintenance and exclusive territories limit
intrabrand competition, raise consumer prices, and impede entry in the
retail sector. The justifications for these restraints are largely theoretical
and not applicable to the vast majority of consumer products.
Resale price maintenance (“RPM”), by design, restricts competition at
the retail level, raises consumer prices, and impedes the emergence of new
retailers and retail formats. It sets a floor on retail prices and prevents
retailers from competing freely on price.203 The harms extend beyond
higher retail prices in the short run. With diminished price competition at
the retail level, retailers are likely to put less pressure on upstream
distributors and manufacturers to cut wholesale prices.204 Resale price
maintenance regimes also inhibit the growth of new innovative retail
models because sellers with a lower cost structure cannot compete freely on
price and share their cost advantages with consumers.205
The procompetitive justifications offered for resale price maintenance
are theoretical and have limited applicability to real-world retail markets.
The principal rationale is the need to protect full-service retailers offering
costly point-of-sale support from the “free-riding” of lower-cost, no-service
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retailers that compete through aggressive discounting.206 At oral arguments
in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., Justice Breyer
noted that this theoretical justification is decades-old and yet continues to
have very limited empirical support.207 Notwithstanding this dearth of
evidentiary support for the free riding theory, the Supreme Court, in its
decisions liberalizing the law on vertical restraints, has stressed the need to
protect against free riding at the retail level.208
While intangible promotional services can be important, they are not
relevant for most consumer goods and can be provided through effective—
and less restrictive—alternatives for goods that require special sales
support. As a practical matter, few goods require retail services.209 The
growth of online commerce has increased the availability of product
information and diminished the need for retail sales support.210 Antitrust
policy should not be made on a theory that is applicable to a very small
subset of manufacturers and products. And for goods that require sales
support, superior alternatives exist. At the retail level, one option is
promotional allowances to retailers that agree to offer a discrete bundle of
services. For instance, a manufacturer of a complex product can pay
retailers a fee on the condition that they provide product demonstrations.211
A manufacturer can also restrict the distribution of its products to, for
example, full-service retailers that provide extensive sales support.212
Given the guaranteed loss of retail competition from vertical restraints
and improbability of offsetting consumer benefits,213 the FTC should hold
resale price maintenance and similar practices such as exclusive
territories214 to be presumptively illegal under Section 5. This standard
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206. John B. Kirkwood, Rethinking Antitrust Policy Toward RPM, 55 ANTITRUST BULL.
423, 443-48 (2010).
207. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 877 (2007);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12-13, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
551 U.S. 877 (2007) (No. 06-480).
208. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 891-92; Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717,
725 (1988).
209. Lao, supra note 203, at 201.
210. Marina Lao, Resale Price Maintenance: The Internet Phenomenon and Free Rider
Issues, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 473, 482 (2010).
211. Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of
the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 478 (2008).
212. Kirkwood, supra note 206, at 447.
213. See, e.g., Alexander MacKay & David Aron Smith, The Empirical Effects of
Minimum Resale Price Maintenance 3 (Univ. of Chi. Kilts Ctr. for Mktg., Paper No. 2-006,
2014) (finding that resale price maintenance is, on the whole, anticompetitive, resulting in
higher prices and lower output).
214. William S. Comanor, Vertical Arrangements and Antitrust Analysis, 62 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1153, 1160 (1987).
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would reflect the high risks of harm from these practices. At the same
time, businesses should be allowed to rebut the presumption by offering
pro-consumer justifications. Specifically, they should be entitled to
overcome the presumption by showing that the restraint is reasonably
necessary and the least restrictive alternative to achieve a beneficial end,
such as the provision of point-of-sale services. For instance, book
publishers may be justified in instituting resale price maintenance. Brickand-mortar sellers provide readers a distinctive opportunity to browse a
wide selection of titles and subjects and receive recommendations from
store staff, which may be services on which online sellers such as Amazon
can free ride.215
C. The FTC Should Challenge Durable or Otherwise Seriously
Harmful Monopolies and Oligopolies
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215. See Julie Bosman, Book Shopping in Stores, Then Buying Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
4, 2011), https://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/04/book-shopping-in-storesthen-buying-online/?ref=todayspaper&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5AFJ-252M] (“Thirty-nine
percent of people who bought books from Amazon in the same period said they had looked
at the book in a bookstore before buying it from Amazon, the survey said. As frustrated
bookstore owners see it, the practice allows customers to take advantage of the stores’
careful selection of books, staff recommendations and warm atmosphere — all while
spending their money elsewhere.”).
216. ECONOMIST, supra note 6.
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In addition to policing against the emergence of monopolistic and
oligopolistic market structures, the FTC should challenge possession of
durable or otherwise harmful monopoly and oligopoly power. Given the
existing levels of concentration in the economy,216 a purely preventative
approach is not likely to be sufficient to tackle the problems of monopoly
and oligopoly. Durable market power can inflict substantial harm on the
public—most obviously through prolonged pricing above competitive
levels or depressed wages for workers and prices for producers. Monopoly
and oligopoly power in the market for necessities, even when it is not
enduring, can similarly result in significant harm. In addition, a monopoly
represents a dramatic example of the concentration of private power and
resources in which a single entity controls an entire market not just today,
but perhaps for an extended period of time. In interpreting Section 5 to
apply to these instances of harmful market power, the FTC would depart
from existing monopolization doctrine in an important way—it would not
require the showing of bad acts on the part of the firm or firms with market
power.
Under present Sherman Act precedent, monopoly power alone is not
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illegal even though it can inflict substantial harm on the public. To invite
legal liability, monopoly power must be accompanied by bad acts, such as
predatory pricing.217 This principle is a long-standing norm in antitrust
case law, preceding the Chicago School reinterpretation.218 Yet, the harm
from market power is no less real even in the absence of bad conduct. For
example, enduring market power can amount to the public paying a private
tax for a product for an extended period of time.219 In the market for
necessities, such as electricity,220 even short periods of market power can
result in massive wealth transfers from consumers to businesses. The
exercise of market power in a number of pharmaceutical markets is the
latest illustration of the real harm inflicted on consumers.221
The doctrinal requirement of bad conduct can be a costly and
unnecessary diversion. In monopolization cases, the aim of the litigation
may be to restructure a noncompetitive market—not merely prohibit
particular bad acts.222 By requiring evidence of anticompetitive behavior,
Section 2 precedent has required the devotion of substantial resources to a
secondary issue and led to interminable and costly litigation, resembling
“an epic Russian film with a bewildering cast of hundreds, byzantine
procedural complexity, and elaborate records.”223
The landmark
monopolization suits against AT&T and IBM embody the problems
associated with a conduct-focused approach. Litigants spent huge sums of
money and years trying to resolve whether the defendants had undertaken
improper acts, when the purpose of the cases was to remedy the persistent
monopolistic structure of the telecommunications and computer markets.224
The FTC should challenge persistent or otherwise harmful market
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217. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
218. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
219. Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr. et al., Elimination of the Conduct Requirement in
Government Monopolization Cases, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 83, 87 (1980).
220. Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Unilateral Market Power in Wholesale Electricity
Markets: The California Market, 1998-2000, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 425, 430 (2003).
221. See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson & Catherine Ho, How Mylan, the Maker of EpiPen,
Became
a
Virtual
Monopoly,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
25,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/2016/08/25/7f83728a-6aee-11e6-ba325a4bf5aad4fa_story.html [https://perma.cc/RPJ7-MXDP] (discussing the harm of current
monopolies to the pharmaceutical industry).
222. See Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 497, 546 (noting the historical preference in the United States for “maintaining
competitive market structures, rather than regulatory dictates”).
223. John J. Flynn, Do the Proposals Make Any Sense from a Business Standpoint? Pro
No-Conduct Monopoly: An Assessment for the Lawyer and Businessman, 49 ANTITRUST L.J.
1255, 1264 (1980).
224. Id. at 1265.
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power under its Section 5 authority even in the absence of bad conduct.
Section 5 should be interpreted to reach these structural problems directly
when a persistent lack of competition or substantial public harm can be
shown. That said, no-fault market power is a departure from existing
antitrust doctrine and should be applied judiciously.225 The required factual
showing should be significant and should only be satisfied in exceptional
cases in which the harm to the public is enduring or otherwise severe.
The FTC should establish two legal standards for no-fault market
power. First, the FTC should show durable monopoly power that has not
been diminished through new entry, technological change, or reduced
demand for the product. Second, and alternatively, the FTC should show
market power that inflicts substantial monetary harm on the public because
it affects the markets for necessities in which demand is highly inelastic.
Examples include the market power that has been witnessed in some
electricity226 and pharmaceutical markets.227 Furthermore, satisfying this
requirement of persistent or substantially harmful market power should
establish only a presumption of illegality. Parties should have the
opportunity to rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the monopoly
power is, for instance, the product of operational efficiencies that would be
lost under a more competitive market structure or was the necessary spur to
innovate, as in certain pharmaceutical markets.228
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225. The European Commission’s careful targeting of exploitative pricing under the
abuse of dominance standard can inform FTC action against durable monopolies. Working
Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, at 10, WD (2011) 54 (Oct. 14, 2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/multilateral/2011_oct_excessive_prices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87X5-GN96] (“The case law . . . shows that the Commission and
European Courts addressed the question of excessive prices only in markets with an
entrenched dominant position where entry and expansion of competitors could not be
expected to ensure effective competition in the foreseeable future.”).
226. Wolak, supra note 220, at 430. See also Severin Borenstein, James B. Bushnell &
Frank A. Wolak, Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California’s Restructured Wholesale
Electricity Market, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1376, 1398 (2002) (finding that between the
summers of 1998 and 2000, oligopoly rents “increased by an order of magnitude, from
about $425 million to $4.44 billion”).
227. Johnson & Ho, supra note 221. The United Kingdom’s Competition and Markets
Authority has brought multiple no-fault monopoly actions against pharmaceutical
companies. E.g., Press Release, Competition & Mkts. Auth., Pharm. Co. Accused of
Overcharging NHS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pharmaceuticalcompany-accused-of-overcharging-nhs [https://perma.cc/4UAL-7BCW]; Press Release,
Competition & Mkts. Auth., CMA Fines Pfizer and Flynn £90 Million for Drug Price Hike
to NHS (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-fines-pfizer-and-flynn90-million-for-drug-price-hike-to-nhs [https://perma.cc/FMT4-HR9Y].
228. Dougherty, Jr. et al., supra note 219, at 90-91.
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D. The FTC Should Favor Simple Structural Remedies
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229. See United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 323 (1961)
(“The proper disposition of antitrust cases is obviously of great public importance, and their
remedial phase, more often than not, is crucial. For the suit has been a futile exercise if the
Government proves a violation but fails to secure a remedy adequate to redress it.”).
230. Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 189-90
(2005).
231. Neil W. Averitt, Structural Remedies in Competition Cases Under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 40 OH. ST. L.J. 781, 833 (1979).
232. STAFF OF THE BUREAU OF COMPETITION OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N, A STUDY OF
THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS (1999), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
attachments/merger-review/divestiture.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3BP-XSKA].
233. Brent Kendall & Peg Brickley, Albertsons to Buy Back 33 Stores It Sold as Part of
Merger
With
Safeway,
WALL ST. J.
(Nov.
24,
2015,
7:26
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/albertsons-to-buy-back-33-stores-it-sold-as-part-of-mergerwith-safeway-1448411193 [https://perma.cc/A62Z-WB7Z]; Brent Kendall & Jacqueline
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Along with establishing presumptions of illegality for competitively
suspicious conduct and bringing persistent or otherwise harmful market
power, the FTC must adopt effective remedies when it establishes a
violation of Section 5. Even clear legal prohibitions on anticompetitive
behavior cannot be effective if they are accompanied by weak, inadequate
remedies.229 Under these circumstances, a company may be allowed to
continue its anticompetitive conduct or a market may remain structurally
noncompetitive.
To ensure the effectiveness of Section 5, the FTC must commit to
simple structural remedies. In cases in which a specific anticompetitive
practice is the principal barrier to a competitive market, a conduct
remedy—a prohibition on this act—may be sufficient to restore
competition. In cases in which the structure of the market is at issue, only a
structural remedy is likely to be sufficient. A conduct remedy, in these
matters, would typically involve a combination of prohibitions,
requirements, and ongoing oversight by the FTC. Conduct remedies are
likely to be incomplete and susceptible to evasion in spirit, if not in letter.230
In contrast, a structural remedy allows for a one-time fix that, if properly
implemented, addresses the problem and removes the need for intrusive
regulatory oversight in the future.231
The FTC should establish a strong presumption in favor of structural
solutions in merger and other matters implicating market structure. In
challenging anticompetitive mergers, the FTC should seek to stop mergers
outright instead of modify them through divestitures. Divestitures have
often failed to preserve competition even from a consumer welfare
perspective.232 Some recent FTC-mandated divestitures in mergers have
failed in spectacular fashion.233 Furthermore, these divestitures do nothing
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to stop the concentration of private economic and political power.
Companies are permitted to grow in size through consolidation, so long as
they sell assets in markets in which there is head-to-head competition. In
dominant firm cases that seek to address the underlying market structure,
the FTC should pursue restructuring remedies that, for example, divide the
company into multiple competing entities or separate related lines of
business into separate firms.
V.

RESPONDING TO LIKELY OBJECTIONS TO AN EXPANSIVE
SECTION 5

The proposed interpretation of Section 5 represents a break with
decades of antitrust thinking and would trigger opposition if adopted. It
harkens back to an older tradition of antitrust that had a more
comprehensive understanding of corporate power than today’s fixation on
short-term price and output effects. Dominant corporations certainly prefer
the permissive antitrust environment at present and would resist any efforts
to strength antitrust doctrine. Industry-funded academics, consultants, and
lobbyists who champion lax antitrust policy would likely be another
important voice against change.234 And even those sympathetic to a more
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Palank, How the FTC’s Hertz Antitrust Fix Went Flat, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2013, 8:03 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303330204579246281764302824
[https://perma.cc/TGT2-URTR].
234. See, e.g., Eisinger & Elliott, supra note 153 (“Economists who specialize in
antitrust — affiliated with Chicago, Harvard, Princeton, the University of California,
Berkeley, and other prestigious universities — reshaped their field through scholarly work
showing that mergers create efficiencies of scale that benefit consumers. But they reap their
most lucrative paydays by lending their academic authority to mergers their corporate
clients propose. Corporate lawyers hire them from Compass Lexecon and half a dozen
other firms to sway the government by documenting that a merger won’t be ‘anticompetitive’: in other words, that it won’t raise retail prices, stifle innovation, or restrict
product offerings. Their optimistic forecasts, though, often turn out to be wrong, and the
mergers they champion may be hurting the economy.”); David Dayen, Google Gets a Seat
on the Trump Transition Team, INTERCEPT (Nov. 15, 2016, 4:08 PM),
https://theintercept.com/2016/11/15/google-gets-a-seat-on-the-trump-transition-team/
[https://perma.cc/D7VX-GMF3] (“Joshua Wright has been put in charge of transition efforts
at the influential Federal Trade Commission after pulling off the rare revolving-door
quadruple-play, moving from Google-supported academic work to government – as an FTC
commissioner – back to the Google gravy train and now back to the government.”).
Looking beyond particular individuals, the ascendancy of the Chicago School in
antitrust can be attributed, in part, to self-interested funding from big business interests:

05/11/2017 10:58:06

Chicago’s intellectual ascendance also aligned fortuitously with the interests of
the increasingly organized business community. Henry Manne, an Antitrust
Workshop alum who was a critical entrepreneur in the law and economics
movement, found that between 1968 and 1971 it became much easier to raise
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expansive Section 5 may express reservations because of past
Congressional backlash against a zealous FTC. At least three arguments
are likely to gain traction in public debates.
The proposed interpretation would defuse one common criticism that
has been leveled against Section 5 for many years. Some commentators
have claimed that Section 5, with its vagueness, creates great uncertainty
for businesses. Per this view, corporations and their counsel do not know
in advance what type of conduct runs afoul of Section 5.235 By establishing
a system of presumptions, the interpretation of Section 5 advanced here
would greatly diminish legal uncertainty and simplify compliance. The
proposed interpretation of Section 5 would have greater clarity than the rule
of reason under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.236 With a series of relative
bright lines, businesses would have much greater legal guidance on
permissible conduct than they do, at present, under the open-ended rule of
reason and Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
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Elizabeth Popp Berman, How Experts Can, and Can’t, Change Policy: Economics,
Antitrust, and the Linked Evolution of the Academic and Policy Fields 24-25 (Jan. 2017)
(unpublished manuscript), https://osf.io/c4bfm/?action=download [https://perma.cc/PF5Y27P9] (footnotes omitted).
235. E.g., James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: The Elusive Meaning of
Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act 33, 52-53 (Geo. Mason Mercatus Ctr., Working
Paper No. 13-20, 2013), http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Perils-Excessive-DiscretionSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/6ZF4-Q7DX] (stating that the ambiguous antitrust provision
of the FTC Act has left businesses unsure of “unfair methods of competition” in comparison
to legal activities).
236. See Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Sailing A Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of
Reason in U.S. Antitrust Law, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 591, 623-24 (2012) (“The
rule of reason is now 100 years old and the promise of clarification through judicial
application has proven to be empty. The rule’s purported standard is devoid of substantive
content that could guide judges to apply it consistently so that patterns could emerge. Not
only has the Court failed to give content to this legal standard, but it has indulged in shifting
the standard around in response to the economic theory du jour.”) (footnotes omitted).
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industry money on its behalf: ‘At this point, the [corporate] world knew that
Chicago economics was the only thing that could possibly save them from an
antitrust debacle, and I related it strongly to that. . . . Well, of the eleven [major
corporations] I wrote to, within a few weeks I had $10,000 from ten of them,
and the last $10,000 came in a few weeks later.’ Similarly, funders of the Airlie
House conference, at which Chicago supporters saw themselves as having
trounced [the structure-conduct-performance school of antitrust thought], read
basically like a list of 1960s Antitrust Division targets: Alcoa, Amoco,
Bethlehem Steel, Exxon, General Electric, General Motors, IBM, and so on.
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A. Attacking the Proposed Interpretation of Section 5 on Efficiency
Grounds Ignores Congressional Intent
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237. Bork, supra note 165.
238. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
239. See supra part II.A.
240. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439-40 (2001)
(quoting Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1450 (1993)).
241. John J. Flynn, The Reagan Administration’s Antitrust Policy, “Original Intent”
and the Legislative History of the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 265-67 (1988).
Even on neoclassical terms, the efficiency paradigm is deficient because it ignores
externalities, a rather major omission at a time of global climate change. Jeffrey L.
Harrison, Some Inconvenient Truths About Antitrust Law and Economics 9 (Univ. Fla.
Levin Coll. of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 17-1, 2017),
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Critics of the proposed interpretation may claim that it would prevent
businesses from engaging in efficiency-enhancing conduct. Conduct that
enhances efficiency, according to the precepts of neoclassical price theory,
would be either prohibited or discouraged under an expansive Section 5,
the critics would claim. The result would be higher prices and reduced
economic output. According to this view, antitrust would once again be a
policy “at war with itself.”237
This objection is wide of the mark and assumes that efficiency is the
proper objective of Section 5 and antitrust law generally. To paraphrase a
line from an iconic dissent of Justice Holmes, the FTC Act does not enact
Mr. Robert Bork’s Antitrust Paradox. 238 Rather, the Congress that enacted
the FTC Act had a grand political economic vision that aimed to protect
consumers and producers from the overwhelming power of large
corporations, preserve businesses’ freedom to compete, and defend
American political institutions from the power of large businesses.239 To
criticize the proposed interpretation of Section 5 for reducing economic
efficiency is to assume that an ill-defined efficiency goal is the appropriate
goal of antitrust. The legislative histories of the antitrust statutes, including
the FTC Act, contradict this assumption in no uncertain terms. As the
Supreme Court has noted, “[c]itizens and legislators may rightly insist that
they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to
deter what they consider morally offensive conduct” and that “efficiency is
just one consideration among many.”240
Allocative efficiency is not somehow “neutral” or “apolitical.” It
seeks to promote a concept of social welfare that takes the existing
distribution of resources as given, posits that human behavior is rational
and selfish, and calls on the state to enforce property and contractual rights
to a maximal degree.241 By omitting any consideration of distributional
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consequence, this conception of efficiency is heavily skewed in favor of the
status quo.242 Exposing these assumptions reveals the conservative nature
of allocative efficiency.
The proposed presumptions would not dismiss the importance of
efficiency in business operations.
Under the proposed Section 5,
businesses that trigger a presumption of illegality, whether due to a
proposed merger or competitively suspect conduct, would have the
opportunity to establish business justifications. For example, a horizontal
merger that exceeds the threshold of twenty percent would be
presumptively illegal. The parties, however, could rebut this presumption
by demonstrating that the merger is necessary and the least restrictive way
to achieve an operational efficiency. This approach would be an inversion
of the current standard in which efficiencies are assumed and
anticompetitive harm has to be shown.243 Efficiencies would no longer be
accepted as a matter of faith in neoclassical economic logic.244 They would
have to be shown. Given the congressional vision for the FTC Act, this is
the appropriate standard.
B. Claiming that Proposed Section 5 Would Create Substantive
Inconsistency Between the FTC and the DOJ Disregards
Congressional Intent and Existing Antitrust Practice
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https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=3500170640030841130670980990871111190
97014088087016004031104071030089006066070008030032012051099111045001108075
00808511907502905807301705206502006801111802402406409008802903212306611611
8090028120117082072076093066073089123024021113079065119111085124070&EXT=
pdf [https://perma.cc/WB9V-M9V3].
242. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REV. 213, 215
(1985).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[T]o
be condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’
That is, it must harm the competitive process and thereby harm consumers. In contrast,
harm to one or more competitors will not suffice.”).
244. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL
OVERSHOT THE MARK 77, 81-86 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (observing how conservative
economic assumptions have driven Supreme Court’s antitrust rulings).
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Critics of the proposed Section 5 would likely also claim that it would
drive a wedge between the statutory authorities of the FTC and those of the
DOJ. Proposed Section 5 would give the FTC more sweeping powers than
the DOJ. An investigation by the FTC could have a very different result
than a comparable investigation by the DOJ. In the context of mergers, this
problem may be most acute because the two agencies have divided up the
review process by industry.
A merger in the chemical industry
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245. See supra Part II.B.
246. See supra Part II.B.
247. The DOJ has brought two Section 2 cases during the Obama years: United States v.
United Cont’l Holdings, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-07992 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 10, 2015); United States
v. United Reg’l Health Care Sys., No. 7:11-cv-00030 (N.D. Tex. filed Feb. 25, 2011). The
FTC has brought at least seven Section 2 cases: McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814 (11th
Cir. 2015); FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., No. 15-cv-3031 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2015);
FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2015); In re IDEXX Labs., Inc.,
155 F.T.C. 241 (2013); In re Pool Corp., F.T.C. No. 101-0115, 2012 WL 159752 (Jan. 10,
2012); In re Intel Corp., 150 F.T.C. 420 (2010); In re Transitions Optical, Inc., 149 F.T.C.
1281 (2010).
248. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Commissioners React to Department
of Justice Report, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act (Sept. 8, 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/09/ftccommissioners-react-department-justice-report-competition-and
[https://perma.cc/KPC3-
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(traditionally reviewed by the FTC) would be subject to different legal
standards than a merger in the airline industry (traditionally reviewed by
the DOJ).
The possibility of divergences would not undercut the case for a more
expansive Section 5. Some differences could be resolved. For example,
the DOJ could, through guidelines and litigation, seek to establish similar
or identical merger standards to the FTC under the Clayton Act, which, like
the FTC Act, is an incipiency statute.
Even when differences would arise, they would reflect a conscious
choice on the part of Congress. When creating the FTC, Congress granted
the FTC more expansive statutory authority than the DOJ. The FTC was
established against the backdrop of the Sherman Act being enforced by the
DOJ and private parties. The Sherman Act had been in existence for
twenty-five years when the FTC came into being. Congress intended for
the FTC Act to reach a larger set of business conduct than the Sherman
Act, which was viewed as not being up to the challenge of controlling the
corporate giants of the day.245 For example, the incipiency standard of the
FTC Act was meant to correct the overly permissive standard of the
Sherman Act.246 The broader reach of Section 5 was a conscious choice by
Congress. Demanding that the DOJ and the FTC apply their powers in an
identical fashion overlooks this Congressional decision.
The divergence criticism ignores current antitrust practice and
assumes an inter-agency harmony that does not exist at present. At any
given time, the DOJ and FTC have different leadership and can be expected
to diverge at least on the margins. For example, the FTC has brought many
more Section 2 actions than the DOJ since 2009, suggesting that the former
views monopolization as a higher priority than the latter.247 And during the
George W. Bush administration, the two agencies clashed in public, most
notably over the meaning of Section 2.248 These are just some of the
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differences between two agencies.
The federal judiciary adds another thick layer of doctrinal
inconsistency today. In a legal system made up of hundreds of district and
appellate judges at the federal system, legal harmony is a futile aspiration.
The existing substantive law in antitrust, which elevates open-ended
standards over rules, guarantees a legal patchwork.249 For instance, a
merger challenge heard by a conservative judge is likely to fare differently
than a merger challenge before a progressive judge. At present, certain
circuits are seen as more sympathetic to particular claims than others.250
The Supreme Court could, of course, establish legal standardization. Yet,
in light of the relatively few cases heard by the Supreme Court in a given
year, harmonization of legal standards is improbable and, at best, likely to
happen after an extended period of conflicting or inconsistent standards in
the lower courts.
C. Recognizing the Threat of Adverse Congressional Action Does Not
Compel Continued Adherence to the Antitrust Status Quo
Among those sympathetic to an expansive Section 5, some are likely
to express reservations about its political feasibility. History certainly
lends support to this concern. Congress has been hostile to an activist FTC
in the past and could be expected to move to rein in any activism. In the
1970s, the FTC zealously pursued its antitrust and consumer protection
missions.251 This period of aggressive enforcement and rulemaking
triggered a powerful backlash from corporate America.252 The Washington
Post condemned the Commission as the “National Nanny” in a stinging
editorial.253 This period of zeal ended poorly for the FTC. Congress
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74ZY] (stating that the Department of Justice Report on Section 2 “is chiefly concerned
with firms that enjoy monopoly or near-monopoly power, and prescribes a legal regime that
places these firms’ interests ahead of those of consumers”).
249. Stucke, supra note 141, at 1432-33.
250. As an example of the divergence, the Third and Ninth Circuits treat loyalty rebates
by dominant firms differently. Compare LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003)
(adopting a more plaintiff-friendly standard) with Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515
F.3d 883, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying standard favoring defendants).
251. William J. Baer, Where to From Here: Reflection on the Recent Saga of the
Federal Trade Commission, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 51, 53 (1986).
252. Michael Pertschuk, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Lecture at the University of
California Berkeley School of Business Administration: Stoning the National Nanny:
Congress and the FTC in the Late 70’s (Nov. 11, 1981), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/688981/19811104_pertschuk_lecture_iii_stoning
_the_national_nanny-_congress_and_the_ftc_in_the_late_70s.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7UALF88].
253. Editorial, The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 1978),
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1978/03/01/the-ftc-as-nationalnanny/69f778f5-8407-4df0-b0e9-7f1f8e826b3b/ [https://perma.cc/632F-DTQL].
254. Baer, supra note 251, at 54.
255. Press Release, House of Representatives Judiciary Comm., Regulatory Reform
Subcommittee to Hold Hearing on the SMARTER Act (June 12, 2015),
https://judiciary.house.gov/press-release/regulatory-reform-subcommittee-to-hold-hearingon-the-smarter-act/ [https://perma.cc/Z95A-XRPG].
256. See, e.g., Victoria Finkle, House Republicans Clash With Consumer Protection
Unit Chief, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/03/17/business/dealbook/house-republicans-clash-with-consumer-protection-unitchief.html [https://perma.cc/PK9K-E99P] (describing criticism levelled at the bureau by
Congressional Republicans and some Democrats).
257. See, e.g., David Dayen, CFPB Turns 5 – and Financial Scammers Aren’t
Celebrating, FISCAL TIMES (July 22, 2016), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/
2016/07/22/CFPB-Turns-5-and-Financial-Scammers-Aren-t-Celebrating
[https://perma.cc/9H6A-FXSZ].
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asserted new power over the agency and imposed additional procedural
conditions on the use of its consumer protection authority.254
This fear of a political backlash from business and Congress may be
the strongest line of criticism of an expansive Section 5. Corporations pour
money into Congressional campaigns to ensure that their interests are
represented and advanced. Although the FTC has been averse to policy
activism or innovation for decades, the House has tried to limit the FTC’s
authority to challenge mergers under Section 5, in the name of creating
harmony between the FTC and the DOJ.255
The recent experience of another federal agency is instructive.
Congressional Republicans, with the support of some Democrats, have
been trying to hobble the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”).256 The CFPB is seen as aggressively pursuing its statutory
mission, bringing a wide range of enforcement actions and writing a
number of rules to regulate consumer finance markets.257 In light of its
vigor, the opposition from Congress does not come as a surprise. Even
under more favorable political circumstances, an FTC that seeks to breathe
life into Section 5 is certain to invite comparable Congressional opposition.
The probable reaction from many ideologically or financially captured
members of Congress should not be underestimated, let alone ignored.
Corporate interests and their Congressional allies would seek to curtail any
Section 5 expansions. The FTC is a creation of Congress and so must
answer to Congress. Congress can undertake a range of actions to limit the
FTC’s day-to-day ability to function and its statutory power. At an
extreme, Congress could repeal the FTC Act and shut down the FTC
entirely. The risks to the FTC’s future would include various existential
threats and should not be brushed aside. Undertaking a reinterpretation of
Section 5 without an awareness of political dynamics on Capitol Hill would
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be a grave mistake.
Yet, these political risks do not call for resignation and indefinite
inaction. Just as the power of corporate interests in American society
cannot be dismissed, the changing political dynamics in the United States
should also not be discounted. Forty years of income stagnation and a
dramatic rise in inequality have brought the merits of existing political
economic arrangements, including weakened antitrust,258 into doubt.259 At
a 2016 Senate antitrust oversight hearing, Democrats and Republicans
raised concern over inadequate antitrust enforcement.260 Even Senator
Mike Lee, a hardline conservative from Utah, questioned the effectiveness
of current merger policy.261 Senator Bernie Sanders, a self-described
democratic socialist, championed economic populism and a revival of the
New Deal and won twenty-two states in his campaign to be the Democratic
nominee for president—a campaign that seemed quixotic just a year ago.262
The Democratic Party now has a faction that seeks to challenge the status
quo across a number of areas,263 including antitrust.264 Public concerns
about the power of corporations are being reported in the mainstream press
again, after years of neglect.265 Even President Trump has raised concerns
about corporate mergers and monopolies,266 though it seems unlikely he
will act in any systematic fashion.267

05/11/2017 10:58:06

C M
Y K

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 93 Side A

258. See supra notes 1 and 2.
259. Jedediah Purdy, A World to Make: Eleven Theses for the Bernie Sanders
Generation, DISSENT MAG. (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.dissentmagazine.org/
online_articles/eleven-theses-bernie-sanders-generation-democratic-socialism
[https://perma.cc/WFN8-N8C3].
260. Cooper, supra note 2.
261. Cooper, supra note 2.
262. Kurtis Lee, Bernie Sanders Signals He’s Winding Down His Campaign, But
Doesn’t Quit, L.A. TIMES (June 16, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-berniesanders-campaign-20160616-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/KS5G-VM9N].
263. E.g., Adam Green, How the Elizabeth Warren Wing Shifted Tuesday’s Democratic
Debate, HUFFINGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-green/how-the-elizabethwarren-_b_8270958.html [https://perma.cc/D6QD-6YXJ] (last updated Oct. 9, 2016)
(stating that Democrats shifted the focus to economic populist issues during the 2016
presidential debates).
264. Warren, supra note 3.
265. See supra notes 1 and 2.
266. Michael J. de la Merced & Cecilia Kang, Future of Big Mergers Under Trump?
Like Much Else, It’s Unclear, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/11/business/dealbook/future-of-big-mergers-under-trumplike-much-else-its-unclear.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/FYR7-MERP].
267. See Brian Fung, Trump Names Maureen Ohlhausen as Acting FTC Chairwoman,
WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2017/01/25/trump-names-maureen-ohlhausen-as-acting-ftc-chairwoman/?utm_
term=.738c83e5845d [https://perma.cc/JRF7-BDSQ] (describing Ohlhausen’s skepticism
toward FTC enforcement actions and FCC’s net neutrality rules).
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The Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) rule to impose
non-discrimination and no-blocking requirements on broadband providers
(popularly known as “net neutrality”)268 offers lessons on how the FTC
could proceed. The FCC’s campaign to establish net neutrality challenged
some of the most powerful corporations in the country and involved
judicial setbacks and multiple policy reversals.269
The FCC succeeded in large measure because of the political support
for net neutrality. Activists and advocates effectively conveyed the
importance of net neutrality to the broader population and tailored their
message to different communities.270 Businesses that stood to lose from the
exclusionary practices of broadband providers also played an important
role in championing net neutrality.271 Furthermore, the FCC enjoyed key
support in Washington, with President Obama272 and a number of
Representatives and Senators273 calling for strong net neutrality rules.274
The groundswell of public support, reflected in the 4 million mostly
supportive comments that were submitted to the FCC,275 and pressure from
high-profile political figures persuaded the FCC to take a strong approach
and surely steeled its political will.
Political and public support for a broad Section 5 is essential. If the
FTC were to proceed without strong public support and backing from the
White House and progressive factions in Congress, it would face long odds
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268. In re Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601 (2015).
269. See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (vacating the FCC’s
2010 net neutrality rules); Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(vacating the FCC’s regulation of Comcast’s broadband network).
270. What Worked in the Fight for Net Neutrality, GETTYSBURG PROJECT (Aug. 2015)
http://gettysburgproject.org/net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/Q8XH-AF6X].
271. Id.
272. Inae Oh, Obama Just Announced His Full Support to Preserve Net Neutrality,
MOTHER JONES (Nov. 10, 2014, 12:05 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/
mojo/2014/11/obama-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/8LJY-6YN5].
273. E.g., Press Release, Office of Senator Ron Wyden, Senators Urge FCC to Promote
Net Neutrality, Reverse Proposal to Create Internet Toll Lanes (May 9, 2014),
https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senators-urge-fcc-to-promote-netneutrality-reverse-proposal-to-create-internet-toll-lanes [https://perma.cc/KW2M-PZRA];
Julian Hattem, Franken: Net Neutrality Is “First Amendment Issue of Our Time”, THE HILL
(July 8, 2014, 4:08 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/211607-franken-netneutrality-is-first-amendment-issue-of-our-time [https://perma.cc/JD3T-D8G8].
274. Edward Wyatt, Obama Asks F.C.C. to Adopt Tough Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/technology/obama-netneutrality-fcc.html [https://perma.cc/8ZJ4-JLWB].
275. Todd Shields, It Took Four Million E-Mails to Get the FCC to Set Net-Neutrality
Rules, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-02-03/a-rant-and-4-million-e-mails-later-fcc-to-set-web-traffic-rules
[https://perma.cc/HTV4-4Q2V].
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276. Richard Hofstadter, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID
STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 189 (1965).
277. For example, Senator John Sherman eschewed the arcane language of economics
and declared:
[If] we will not endure a king as a political power we should not endure a king
over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessaries of life. If
we would not submit to an emperor we should not submit to an autocrat of
trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity.
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21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890).
278. Fung, supra note 267.
279. Thomas Piketty, We Must Rethink Globalization, or Trumpism Will Prevail,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2016/nov/16/globalization-trump-inequality-thomas-piketty
[https://perma.cc/6EYHCENA].
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of success. One agency alone, regardless of its determination, cannot stand
up to the power of big business.
If, however, the FTC can draw on and reinforce public support and
count on the White House and Congress to champion its efforts, it has a
much better chance of overcoming powerful opposition. Activists and
advocates who support open, competitive markets would have to play a
principal role in explaining the significance of Section 5 to the public. As
the net neutrality episode shows, skilled advocates can explain and
demonstrate the significance of arcane issues such as telecommunications
policy to a lay audience. Antitrust law, which once inspired popular
movements,276 can certainly be translated into accessible and compelling
language.277 Moreover, businesses that are threatened by dominant
incumbents would also have to be engaged and mobilized to challenge the
power and narrative of the anti-Section 5 monopolists and oligopolists.
While the near term is bleak on antitrust, among other areas, a future
FTC may be in a position to restore the progressive-populist foundation of
antitrust law.
Under the leadership of the conservative Maureen
Ohlhausen, the FTC appears poised for at least a few more years of
dormancy.278 But looking past the immediate future and to subsequent
leadership, the FTC may have an opportunity to make antitrust a force
against concentrated private power and for ordinary Americans.
An antitrust revival through Section 5 would not be easy and would
require determination and patience on the part of those inside and outside
government who believe in a reinvigorated Section 5. And success, even
under the best circumstances, would not be guaranteed. Yet, popular
demand for aggressive anti-monopoly action seems to be growing. Given
economic realities, the growing discontent in the country in general does
not appear poised to subside any time soon.279 And the success of the
FCC’s net neutrality rules show that there is a way forward for the FTC
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even in the face of fierce corporate opposition. The FTC’s defeats in the
late 1970s do not compel another generation of agency quiescence.
CONCLUSION
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After decades of practical exile from popular discussion, monopoly
and oligopoly are topics of public debate again.
Politicians and
commentators from across the ideological spectrum acknowledge that there
is a lack of competition across the U.S. economy and that the harms from
this noncompetitive industrial structure are very real. Importantly, many
observers have recognized that the current industrial structure in the United
States was the product of a deliberate policy choice. Beginning in the late
1970s and accelerating in the 1980s under the Reagan administration,
antitrust officials in the executive branch and federal judges reinterpreted
these laws to focus narrowly on the neoclassical economic concept of
allocative efficiency and adopted legal standards favorable to powerful
corporate defendants. This stealth counterrevolution reinterpreted laws that
Congress had enacted to check the myriad harms from concentrated
corporate power.
Although any judicial efforts to reinterpret the antitrust laws in accord
with Congress’s original vision are uncertain and likely to take years, if not
decades, the Federal Trade Commission under progressive leadership has
the power to restore progressive-populist antitrust in the more immediate
future.
Under contemporary administrative law and Congressional
delegation of policymaking power, the Federal Trade Commission has
broad authority to resurrect antitrust law under Section 5 of the FTC Act.
In enacting this statute, Congress wanted the FTC to police “unfair
methods of competition” that injure consumers and smaller sellers, prevent
competitors from competing on the merits, and allow large corporations to
dominate our political system. Congress intended the FTC’s antitrust
authority to encompass more than the prohibitions in the Sherman and
Clayton Acts and to nip anticompetitive problems in the embryonic stage
before they harmed markets and society.
For more than thirty years, the FTC has been a proponent of an
antitrust that stresses the primacy of economic efficiency. The FTC’s
Section 5 Statement indicated that the Commission would use its Section 5
authority to advance “consumer welfare” and apply the rule of reason
framework. In articulating this narrow interpretation of Section 5, the FTC
contradicted Congress’s broader political economic vision in 1914, which
sought to prevent not only short-term injuries to consumers but also
exclusionary practices by large businesses and the accumulation of private
political power. Furthermore, the FTC adopted the complicated rule of
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reason that arguably cannot even protect consumers, let alone advance the
progressive-populist philosophy underpinning Section 5.
Despite being a champion of the efficiency paradigm since 1981, the
FTC in the future could still change course and be true to Congressional
intent in creating the agency in 1914. In setting out an interpretation of
Section 5, whether through enforcement actions or rulemakings, the FTC
should anchor Section 5 in the expansive political economic vision of
Congress. In enacting the Federal Trade Commission Act to supplement
the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Congress sought to prevent three principal
harms from concentrated economic power: wealth transfers exacted by
monopolies, oligopolies, and cartels, privately-erected barriers to
competition, and accumulation of economic and political power in
corporate hands. To advance Congress’s antitrust vision and aim for the
FTC Act to be a prophylactic statute, the FTC should adopt presumptions
of illegality for a variety of competitively suspicious conduct, challenge
durable or otherwise significantly harmful monopolies, and support simple
structural remedies. In adopting the proposed interpretation of Section 5,
the FTC would be true to the vision Congress had in creating the
Commission a century earlier and respond to growing popular and political
demands to tackle the curse of pervasive monopoly and oligopoly in the
economy.
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